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United We Stand:
The Anti-Competitive Implications of
Media Ownership of Athletic Teams
in Great Britain
ABSTRACT

This Note analyzes the increasing integration of the
sports and broadcasting industries and the British
framework for evaluating the permissibility of transactions
furthering such integration. In the context of the recent
attempted takeover of Britishfootball club Manchester United
by Rupert Murdoch's British Sky Broadcasting, the Note
examines how the Monopolies and Mergers Commission
(MMC) was uniquely poised to fully consider the ramifications
of this developing nexus of sports and media and evaluates
the significance of the MMC's decision on the future of both
industries.
A diverse array of domestic, international,political, and
economic issues and implications face any court or
administrative agency confronted with a media/sports
merger. Although the MMC ultimately recommended that the
British Sky Broadcasting-Manchester United merger be
prohibited, it will only be determined through the united
considerationof such an array of issues whether the vertical
integration of broadcasting and professional athletics is
merely the inevitable result of a growing trend or a legitimate
cause of concern for free competition in sports and media
worldwide.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the sport of football, or soccer in the United States, the
last line of defense is the sweeper, a free, roaming player who
The
plays behind all the defenders except the goalkeeper.'
developing
observe
can
he
perspective;
sweeper has a unique
attacks from a withdrawn position, guide and caution his fellow
defenders accordingly, and when necessary, step in to halt any
2
The
scoring threat that breaks through the back line.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC or Commission), one
of three divisions of the British government's antitrust authority,
may have functioned as the most important sweeper in English
football history when it stymied an offensive3 assault that
threatened the future of the sport in Great Britain.
Administrative agencies such as the MMC are frequently
confronted with escalating economic trends that, if left
unchecked, could change the face of an industry forever. Rarely,
however, does such an agency have the ability to alter such a
trend through one decision. The MMC recently possessed both
the opportunity and the ability to mold the current interrelation
of two separate industries-broadcasting and professional
athletics-and guide their development for years to come.
However, it remains to be seen whether the MMC's action
successfully leveled the competitive playing field in British sports
and broadcasting or accidentally put the ball in the back of its
own net.

The author holds a national coaching license in the sport of soccer and
1.
specialized as both a player and coach in the sweeper position.

2.

See supranote 1.

This Note will focus primarily on the MMC's investigation of the
3.
attempted takeover of British football club Manchester United by satellite
broadcaster British Sky Broadcasting. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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The Convergence of the Sports and BroadcastingIndustries

Although some believe the impending convergence of
broadcasting and professional athletics has potentially serious
anti-competitive implications, others view the two industries as
natural partners, dependent on each other for continued
profitability. 4 The business of professional sports is one of the
most visible and lucrative industries on the planet, due in large
part to the ever-increasing media coverage it receives. 5 Athletes
currently receive greater exposure, demand greater attention, and
incite greater adulation than ever before. 6 New stadiums singlehandedly revitalize crumbling urban areas. 7
Sports stars,
voluntarily or involuntarily, become role models for children from
a diversity of backgrounds. Athletes earn hundreds of millions of
dollars in salaries 8 and even more for their teams and the
companies whose products they endorse.
Media broadcasting conglomerates
are fast becoming
similarly omnipotent and ubiquitous. 9 Broadcasters utilize the
latest technology to bring the public hundreds of specialized

4.
"Sports 'absolutely overpowers' film and all other forms of
entertainment in attracting television viewers," according to Rupert Murdoch,
whose failed takeover attempt of the English football club Manchester United is
the subject of this Note. See Barry Came et al., Murdoch's Big Play, MACLEAN'S,
Oct. 19, 1998, at 56. "The world has become a playground for the media
conglomerates as they pursue live, unscripted programming that is more valuable
than ever on an increasingly crowded dial." Harvey Araton, Bizball, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Oct. 18, 1998, 59, at 61.
5.
See id. at 60.
6.
See id. at 60-61.
7.
See Alan Katz, Latest May be Greatest Jewels Starting Second Golden
Age, DENVER POST, March 31, 1995, at 3. New sports arenas in the United States
such as Baltimore's Camden Yards, Cleveland's Jacob's Field, and Denver's Coors'
Field have revitalized urban areas and inspired an influx of new businesses and
renovation work on existing downtown architecture and industry. See id. Even
those arenas built in the mid to late 1980s are now considered obsolete in light of
the unqualified success of the more recent structures. See Heather Bird,
Skydome Sags in Middle Age, TORONTO SUN, March 2, 1999, at 5; see also Jay
Mariotti, Empty Seats Tell Story of Team in Crisis, CHIC. SUN TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998,
at 98.
8.
See Araton, supra note 4, at 60. "Who could have imagined a decade
ago that a single player, even one as breathtaking as Michael Jordan, could reel in
a reported $80 million in salary and endorsements in a single year?" Id.
9.
Mass media mergers appear to have become the wave of the future, or
at least an extremely attractive current option. See generally Keith Conrad, Note,
Media Mergers: First Step in a New Shift of Antitrust AnalysisP, 49 FED. COM. L.J.
675 (1997) (providing an overview of the history of media mergers). Recent mergers
have spawned a growing relationship between the production source and a
distribution outlet. See id. at 680. "[Tjhe executives of the large media
conglomerates pleasantly refer to this as 'synergy' while critics warn that it
eliminates competition." See id.
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digital and satellite channels and instantaneous information
services 10 while maintaining a stranglehold on society's
traditional and preeminent source of news and entertainmentterrestrial television." A large portion of the recent surge in the
profitability of media ventures can be directly traced to the almost
12
guaranteed audience for professional sports.
As a result, sports and media industries have grown to be

inextricably linked and remain heavily dependent on one another
for their respective livelihoods. 13 The structure and rules of
sporting events are already dictated to a large degree by television
coverage: (1) live events are periodically interrupted to provide
television commercial time, (2) the prevalence of night games has
increased to maximize viewing audiences, and (3) the market
price for star athletes is a clear function of ever-escalating
broadcast rights revenues. 14
Media groups are at least as
financially dependent on sports, as evidenced by the exorbitant
sums of money paid for the broadcasting rights to professional

10.
"Satellite dishes provide more games in a year than most could watch
in a lifetime ....
The sports cable networks never sleep, and when they run short
of viable programming, they can always make something up, as ESPN has done
with its Extreme, or X, Games." Araton, supra note 4, at 63.
11.
The term "terrestrial television" is used to describe one of the various
modern television broadcasting markets, the other two being cable television and
satellite television. See Phillip L. Spector et al., Appendix L: Survey of National
Broadcasting,Cable and DTH Satellite Laws, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 715,
741-44 (Fall 1997); see also Steven Ruth, Comment, The Regulation of Spillover
Transmissionfrom Direct Broadcast Satellites in Europe, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 107,
108 (Dec. 1989).
12.
These developing circumstances are by no means a uniquely American
phenomenon. See infra Part V.B. 1. At the 1996 annual meeting of his worldwide
media conglomerate News Corporation International, Murdoch made clear his
plans for the future of sports broadcasting. See Came et al., supra note 4, at 56.
"We have the long-term rights in most countries to major sporting events and we
will be doing in Asia what we intend to do elsewhere in the world-that is, use
sports as a battering ram and a lead offering in all our pay-television operations."
Id.
As the world has grown smaller, the international interest in sports and
entertainment has expanded dramatically, and, along with it, the disparity of
resources between large and small competitors in both industries. See Araton,
supra note 4, at 64. "The players are richer, the arenas are nicer, and the

telecasts are better, but the financial and ideological divide has grown ....
Sports has a class crisis in ownership that mirrors the one in the stands." Id. at
61, 64; see also infra Part II.A and note 36.
13.
See generally infra Part II.
14.
The concern is that, as sports clubs are gradually integrated into
broadcasting companies, the broadcasters will begin to exercise significant control
over how the game is played. See Ian Bell, Rupert's Puzzle Falls Into Place,
SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Dec. 12, 1998, at 24. The broadcasters do this as a means
of ensuring a return on their investment both by acquiring the most talented
players and by presenting the game in an exciting and innovative but made-for-TV
way. See infra note 70 and accompanying text. Many fans who enjoy attending
live matches in person question these improvements to the game. See Bell, supra,
at 24.
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athletic competitions, the emergence of total sports channels, and
the price paid by advertisers for a thirty-second time slot during
worldwide televised championship events.' 5 As a result of this
apparent codependency, the vertical integration of sports teams
and broadcasting providers seems to be a rational solution to

preserving the vitality of both industries. 16

B. The Anti-Competitive Effect of VerticalIntegration
From an alternative perspective, the extensive intermingling
of broadcasting and athletics is thought to pose ominous
prospects for the long-term future of both industries. Perhaps
the most recognizable and troubling effect of permitting media
ownership of athletic teams is the anti-competitive impact such a
17
vertical integration may have on participants in each industry.
This concern is especially exacerbated in the professional
athletics industry, in which competition is not merely an idealistic
goal but its very essence.
A sport such as football is not comprised of programs offered
by individual entities that consumers may freely choose between
in the marketplace.' s Nor are the individual teams themselves
truly competing entities operating in a free market. 19
The

15.
See Araton, supra note 4. In America, the NFL deal at present is
spread out among various networks over eight years and is worth $17.6 billion.
See id. at 61. The current NBA contract is for $2.4 billion over four years. See id.
16.
See id. at 60. In the market for sports broadcasting, the financial
backing of mega-media corporations helps athletic clubs acquire the most soughtafter players, both as a result of the amount they are capable of spending on
salaries as well as the high visibility that consistent television coverage can offer.
See id. at 61. From a broadcasting perspective, the opportunity to assure oneself
of long-term valuable programming content is unique, especially when a media
company needs only purchase one team to acquire those rights, as opposed to
sharing in a league-wide arrangement. See generally Came et al., supranote 4, at
57.
17.
See infra Part I.C. These concerns were borne out in the British
government's investigation of British Sky Broadcasting's attempted takeover of
Manchester United. See Ben Potter, MMC to Probe BSkyB's Offer for Manchester
United, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 30, 1998, at 33. The Trade and Industry
Secretary at the beginning of the investigation, Peter Mandelson, "agreed with the
Office of Fair Trading that the transaction raised competition issues in respect of
the broadcasting of 'premium' football and the broadcasting market and wider
public interest concems over the implications for football." Id.
Vertical integration is the process by which an entity acquires rather than
builds its own claim of distribution. Although such behavior can enhance
efficiency, the major concem is that such integration will allow a firm with market
power in one market to use that power as leverage to control a second market. See
E. THOMAS SULLIVAN

& HERBERT

HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY AND PROCEDURE

785 (4th ed., 1999).
18.
See The Soccer Business has Returned to a Level Playing Field,
INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 10, 1999, at 3.
19.
See id.
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products being sold-the games-are the result of two teams'
collaborative, yet adversarial efforts. 2 0 Success on the field is
each team's ultimate goal in order to maintain profits through
21
However, a
spectators' repeat purchases of such products.
league of such teams must establish an organized series of games
with a winner declared according to the rules of the sport and not
the rules of the market. 2 2
Thus, the business of professional sports is unlike all other
industries, in that competition is not the means to the end, but
the end itself. Each team seeks to become as strong, skilled, and
successful as possible in order to prevail over all others. Yet, the
aggregate effect of such behavior is to increase the overall level of
competition and, with it, the number of spectators paying
admission.
With the onset of recent technological advances, the primary
profit source in sports has shifted from the limited audiences
attending the matches to the unlimited number of viewers at
home, watching on television. 2 3 To maximize these profits, most
sports leagues have chosen to negotiate broadcasting rights
arrangements collectively and sell such rights to the highest
24
bidder.
As the live transmission of sporting events to large audiences
produces so much of the business value of sports (tickets,
salaries, advertising, merchandizing, etc.), the professional sports
industry has become especially susceptible to the external
influence of those who provide its greatest revenue-the
broadcasters. While advances in technology have made such

Each team desires to prevail in the match, but the more

20.

See id.

21.
22.

See id.
See id. "At one level, sport is simply a branch of the entertainment

competitive the games, the more exciting and unpredictable the result, generating
more viewer interest and resulting in more profits. See id.
industry, and should be treated in the same way as the movies, television and tenIt is a sport which grew
But soccer is not-yet-a show ....
pin bowling ....
organically from thousands of local teams, sustained by the loyalties of millions of
supporters. Even Manchester United began as Newton Heath, a local railway
works' team." Id.
See also Araton, supra note 4.
23.
The benefits of the collective negotiation of broadcasting rights are
24.
numerous. Such practice (1) creates a more uniform telecast, (2) increases the
amount bid for the rights as the winning bidder knows he will receive all revenues
generated by that league's telecast, and (3) benefits the smaller market teams by
equally distributing the consideration paid by the broadcaster to each club. See
infra Part VI.D. (discussing the beneficial effects of such collective negotiation in
America). While collective arrangements boast such advantages, exclusive deals
such as British Sky Broadcasting's agreement to broadcast the Premier League
came under considerable scrutiny in a suit brought by the Office of Fair Trading
(OFT) in the Restrictive Practices Court (RPC). See infra Part II.D. (analyzing
arguments presented before the RPC).
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interaction inevitable, an increased cause for concern arises in
both the sports and broadcasting industries when these
previously external influences "internalize" themselves by
purchasing the individual teams and use them as leverage in a
separate market-sports broadcasting.
Not only may the substantial concentration of market power
in a single broadcasting entity lead to dominance in the sports
broadcasting market,25 but it may also create a general coercive
power over an entire sport in terms of organization, competition
and public accessibility, especially when a dominant broadcaster
acquires a similarly successful professional sports franchise. 26
As the incentive for such acquisitions has increased, 2 7 the fear of
such dominance has inspired a tremendous controversy
concerning the future interrelation of broadcasters and
professional sports teams.
C. British Sky Broadcasting'sAttempted Takeover

of Manchester United
The opportunity to examine and challenge the trend towards
total integration of sports and media arose recently in Great
Britain when on October 29, 1998, the most expensive takeover
deal in the history of sports was put on hold pending review by
the MMC. 28 Media mogul Rupert Murdoch sought to purchase
the British football club Manchester United (United) through his
satellite television company, British Sky Broadcasting (Sky or
BSkyB). 29 Sky currently owns the broadcast rights to the English
Premier League, 30 the top professional level of English football

25.
See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
26.
See infra Part VI.C. One major concern of Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry Stephen Byers, who ruled that the Manchester United takeover
should be prohibited, was that the deal would give British Sky Broadcasting
"additional influence over Premier League decisions about the organisation of
football, leading to some decisions which would not reflect the game's long term
interests." Roundup: UK Govt Blocks BSkyB Takeover of Manchester Utd, AFX
NEWS (London), Apr. 9, 1999, Company News.
27.
With the incredible profits the sports industry has recently generated,
bids for broadcasting rights have increased almost exponentially. As will be
discussed in this Note, many large media conglomerates have determined that it is
cheaper and more efficient in the long run to own the right to broadcast an
individual club's matches rather than merely rent it.
28.
See infra Part IV.
29.
See Patrick Harverson, Murdoch United PLC-Empire of the Sun, TOTAL
SPORT, Dec. 1998, at 95.
30.
Sky has exclusive rights-acquired for more than $1 billion two years
ago-to broadcast the Premier League until the 2001-2002 season. See Eric
Boehm, A Whole New Ballgame-Media Mogul Rupert Murdoch Purchases the
ManchesterUnited ProfessionalSoccer Team, VARIETY, Sept. 14, 1998, at 28.
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3
and the league of which United is the perennial champion. '
Although United is the top British team and one of the most
32
popular and highly successful football clubs worldwide,
Murdoch's £625 million bid was extraordinary, setting the record
While United would clearly have
for a sports franchise. 33
benefited from such a deal, the takeover created intense public
outrage throughout the nation (most remarkably among United's

34
own fans).
Upon recommendation from the Office of Fair Trading (OFT)

and the subsequent approval of the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry, the United matter was referred to the MMC for an

investigation of its anti-competitive effects. The MMC ultimately
concluded that Sky's purchase of United should be prohibited,
based on the resulting market power increase to Sky from

35
acquiring United's football broadcast rights for pay television.

The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry accepted the MMC's

31.
See id. United has been the dominant team this decade in English
football, winning four Premier League titles and finishing runner up three other
times. See id. The Red Devils (United's nickname) have a worldwide following and
numerous fan-maintained websites, many of which were consulted in the
preparation of this Note.
Several quotes by Secretary Byers provide further evidence of the interest
generated by Sky's attempted takeover, and by United in general. "'I now know
that Manchester United even has 8,000 supporters in Kuala Lumpur,' he said
with the weary air of someone who had received a letter from many, if not most, of
them in recent weeks." Andrew Alderson et al., Murdoch's Red Card, SUNDAY
Secretary Byers also referred to
TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 11, 1999, at 21.
another encounter in Egypt in which he "was being driven by a taxi driver in Cairo
at the beginning of this year and the four words of English he knew were
Thatcher', 'Blair', and 'Manchester United.'" Id.
32.
Even prior to hearing of the negative findings of the MMC, Murdoch
had already moved in on broadcasting rights to Italian soccer, with a proposed
£1.5 billion bid. See infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text. Italian clubs
with no individual TV deals initially backed Murdoch, while many of the larger
clubs had already signed with French competitor Canal Plus for £50 million. See

id.
33.
£625 million equaled $1.07 billion at the time of the bid. See Araton,
supra note 4, at 60; see also Came et al., supra note 4. The deal dwarfed the
recent purchases of the Cleveland Browns expansion National Football League
franchise for $530 million and the Washington Redskins at over $700 million. See
id.
34.
See Manchester United Shareholders Vent Anger Over BSkyB Bid, EXTEL
EXAMINER (London), Nov. 19, 1998, Company News, Takeovers and Acquisitions
Section; see also Steve Millar, Football: Fans Slow Red Devil Takeover, MIRROR
Andy Walsh, chairman of the Independent
(London), Nov. 12, 1998, at 62.
Manchester United Supporters Association (IMUSA), said the referral of the matter
to the MMC was "a moral victory for the ordinary guy on the street. No one else in
the world has managed to stand up to Murdoch, but a group of raggy-trousered

fans from Manchester have [sic] done it." Id.
35.
See Britain Blocks BSkyB Effort to Take Over a Soccer Team, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 10, 1999, at B2.
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findings and declared that the transaction would be blocked by
36
the government.
D. The Office of FairTrading'sCase Against the PremierLeague

Sky's United bid, however, was not the only debate regarding
the interrelation of sports and media recently undertaken by the
British government. A case pending in the Restrictive Practices
Court (RPC) further complicated the situation.3 7 The outcome of
this case, brought by the OFT against the English Premier League
itself,3 8 had the potential to significantly affect the ability of
Premiership clubs to negotiate future collective broadcasting
39
deals.
Despite the OFT's allegations that Sky's league-wide
agreement with the Premier League created a monopoly that

infringed upon consumers' choice and increased the cost of
viewing, the RPC found that the exclusive selling of broadcast
rights to the English Premiership was not against the public
40
interest.
Although resolved several months after the MMC
recommendation, the RPC case to a certain extent dictates the
importance of the MMC's response to the United deal. The
collective result of the two investigations will likely set the tone for

36.
See Alderson et al., supra note 31. Secretary Byers said that "the
merger would adversely affect competition between broadcasters" and that "the
merger would damage the quality of British football by reinforcing the trend
towards growing inequalities between the larger, richer clubs and the smaller,
poorer ones." Philip Pank, London Blocks Murdoch/BSkyB Takeover of Manchester
United, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 9, 1999 (Financial Pages). Essentially, the
government feared that Sky would "gain influence over and information about the
Premier League's selling of coverage rights for top-flight English soccer that would
not be available to its competitors." Id.
See Dan Gledhill, Football Faces a Trial by TV Rights, INDEPENDENT
37.
(London), June 27, 1999, at 3.
38.
See Stuart Millar & Janine Gibson for football.guardian,Murdoch and
Man Utd-Murdoch Goes for Double with Club and TV FootballDeal (Sept. 8, 1998),
(web-page
<http://wwv.reports.guardian.co.UK/sp-reports/manutd/563.html>
no longer accessible, copy of document on file with author). The Office of Fair
Trading pursued a case at the Restrictive Practices Court seeking to have the
Premiership judged a cartel and the current collective contract with Sky voided.
See id. It was this inquiry that clearly inspired Murdoch to attempt to purchase
United in an effort to hedge against his own Premiership deal in the event of an
unfavorable RPC decision. See id.
39.
See Boehm, supra note 30. "The TV rights to the Premier League are
under review to determine whether the current collective deal for all 20 Premier
League teams is anti-competitive. Should the U.K.'s Office of Fair Trading decide
against collective bargaining, clubs would be free to negotiate individually." Id.;

see also Peter Thal Larsen, FootballOFT Investigation:TV Free-for-allCould Lead to
a Breakaway; The Future, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 12, 1999, at 19.
40.
See Court Rules in Favor of BSkyB-Premiership Football Broadcasting
Deal, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July 28, 1999, (Sports Section).
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and television media in
the integration of professional sports
41
century.
next
the
into
Britain
Great
This Note analyzes the increasing integration of the sports
and broadcasting industries and the British framework for
evaluating the permissibility of transactions furthering such
integration, specifically the United takeover. The Note will also
examine how the MMC was uniquely poised to fully consider the
ramifications of this developing nexus of sports and media and
will evaluate the significant impact that the MMC's decision may
have on the future of both industries.
Part II of this Note contains a brief overview of the
background and the motivating factors behind Sky's attempted
takeover of United. Part III then considers the nature of the
governmental inquiry undertaken in relation to the United
transaction, detailing the overall structure of the British antitrust
system and the particularized responsibilities of the MMC and
evaluating. the recent changes made to this system. Part IV
discusses the MMC's recommendation to prohibit the merger and
the factors considered by the MMC in reaching that conclusion.
A diverse analysis of domestic and international precedent and
policy follows in Part V, outlining the divergent international
backdrop against which the MMC's decision was reached.
The Note culminates in Part VI, which contains a critical
analysis of the British government's decision and an evaluation of
whether the full vertical integration of broadcasting and
professional athletics is merely the inevitable result of a growing
trend or a legitimate cause of concern for free competition in
sports and media worldwide.

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATING FACTORS

To best understand the interests advanced and the dangers
posed by media ownership of athletic teams and to specifically
consider the interests and dangers presented by Sky's purchase
of United, it is first necessary to explore the nature and extent of
Rupert Murdoch's media empire. Additionally, in order to fully
appreciate the opportunity for dominance of the football and
broadcasting markets created by the United takeover, the
takeover bid must be analyzed in the context in which it
developed and in light of its underlying motivations.

41.
See Boehm, supra note 30. "The bid marks the start of a global race
for the $200 billion a year soccer business where the price of broadcasting rights
is rising 40% annually and player salaries and ticket prices are soaring." Id.
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A. Murdoch's Media Empire

Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation (News Corp.) is truly a
worldwide media conglomerate. Among its many divisions are (1)
43
Sky,4 2 the British satellite entity seeking to purchase United
and (2) Fox Entertainment Group, 44 a U.S.-based company that
purchased the Los Angeles Dodgers of Major League Baseball
(MLB) for $311 million in March 199745 and also owns Fox
46
SportsNet, a network of twenty-two local cable sports channels.

Fox additionally holds non-exclusive rights to broadcast National
Football League (NFL) and MLB games. 4 7

The scope of Murdoch's broadcasting empire extends to the
Far East as well, where his Hong Kong-based Star TV channel

provides coverage throughout the region of international cricket,
football, rugby, and American sports. 4 8 Further, in his native
Australia, Murdoch owns fifty percent of the continent's main

rugby league competition, along with broadcast rights to club and
49
international rugby union, rugby league, and cricket.

Murdoch additionally possesses a substantial print media
enterprise, featuring the British newspapers The Times of London,
The Sun, and News of the World as well as the U.S paper, The

42.
See generally Joanna Cagan & Neil deMause, Bizbrawl: How the Heavy
Hitters are Fighting to Control the Planet, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 18, 1998, at 66;
see also Harverson, supranote 29.
43.
Murdoch's News Corp. owns a 40% share of Sky. See Cagan &
deMause, supra note 42, at 66. In Britain, the rights to Premier League football
turned Sky from a liability "into the world's most profitable satellite-television
operator, and the dominant power in pay-television business in Britain." Murdoch
United: Even if the Whole of Britain Hates the Idea, Rupert Murdoch Should be
Allowed to Buy ManchesterUnited, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1998, at 20.
44.
See Alan Deutschman, Sly as Fox: Sports is the Surreptitious 'Battering
Ram' of Rupert Murdoch's Campaignfor Global Media Dominance, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Oct. 18, 1998, at 68. Owned equally by News Corp. and Liberty Media
Corporation, Fox has 58 million subscribers and owns a 40% share of the National
Basketball Association's (NBA) New York Knicks and the National Hockey League's
(NHL) New York Rangers and owns a 40% interest in the Los Angeles Staples
Center, including an option to purchase 40% of the Los Angeles Kings NHL
franchise and slightly under 10% of the L.A. Lakers NBA team. See Came et al.,
supranote 4.
45.
See id. Murdoch paid $479 million for the Dodgers team, stadium, real
estate, and licensing rights, which had previously been valued at $277 million.
See id.
46.
See Cagan & deMause, supranote 42.
47.
See id. Since Murdoch's then-struggling Fox Network secured a four
year deal to broadcast NFL games for $2.43 billion, the network has established
itself as the fourth national network in America and is now worth an estimated
$10.8 billion. See Came et al., supranote 4.
48.
See Harverson, supranote 29.
49.
See id.
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5 0
New York Post.
Finally, Murdoch owns book publisher
5
HarperCollins and 20th Century Fox Film Studios. '
The sheer size and scope of Murdoch's holdings clearly signal
the possibility of the devastating competitive impact such a
conglomerate could have in either the broadcasting industry or on
the athletic fields. Yet, Murdoch's empire itself must be
considered in the context of a larger, developing trend. While at
first glance Murdoch's global media holdings and recent forays
into sports franchise ownership may seem unique, in light of the
increasing commercialization of sports, these unique facts have
already become a familiar scenario.
Although Murdoch clearly exerts massive media influence on
athletics worldwide, he is not without rivals.
In the United
States, both Disney and Time Warner have comparable holdings
and clout in sports and broadcasting.5 2 Further, smaller media
ventures based or operating in the United Kingdom were eagerly
anticipating the outcome of the MMC investigation, each hoping
to capitalize on an opportunity to emulate Murdoch's strategy on
a more localized scale.5 3
Although most of these British
competitors cannot challenge Murdoch's News Corp. in market
share, many of these rivals were ready to pounce on other high
profile football clubs, waiting for the perceived go ahead from the

50.

See Cagan & deMause, supra note 42.

51.
52.

See id.
See id. at 66-67. Disney not only owns the Mighty Ducks of Anaheim

franchise of the NHL and a controlling interest in Major League Baseball's
Anaheim Angels but also the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), the
Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN), and partial rights to
broadcast NFL and MLB games. See id. To round out its own empire, Disney of
course owns Disneyland and Disneyworld, along with Touchstone and Miramax
film studios, and ESPN the Magazine. See id.
Time Warner, as a result of its own recent merger with Turner Broadcasting,
now owns MLB's Atlanta Braves, the NBA's Atlanta Hawks, the NHL's expansion
Atlanta Thrashers, the Goodwill Games, and World Championship Wrestling
(WCW). See id. Now the world's largest media corporation, Time Warner also
owns Cable News Network (CNN), Home Box Office (HBO), Turner Network
Television (TNT), and Turner Broadcasting Systems (TBS). See id. In addition to
cable broadcasting, Time Warner is the owner of Warner Brothers film and
network television, New Line Cinemas, print media such as Time Magazine and
Sports Illustrated, and five major record labels. See id. Turner Sports in 1997
signed a four-year $890 million deal to continue as the NBA's cable partner. See
id.
53.
See Boehm, supra note 30. Immediately after the announcement, it
was learned that ITV station owner Carlton Communications was negotiating to
buy a club of its own, London's Arsenal, for $459 million. See Mihir Bose, Soccer:
Newcastle Directors on a Premium-Media and Telecommunications Group Pays 10
Million Pounds for a 6.3 per cent share in Troubled Team, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Dec. 18, 1998, at 42. Both Arsenal and Newcastle have enjoyed lasting
success at the top of the English Premier League and remain attractive targets for
media takeovers. See id.
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MMC. 5 4 Even though the green light never came, the question
still remains following the MMC's recommendation whether any
corporate nexus between media and sports will conflict with
competition and public interest policy goals, or whether such
goals are specifically compromised only by a Sky takeover of
United.
Although many rival broadcasters were ready to follow
Murdoch's lead in attempting to purchase their own sports
programming content, Murdoch's position remained somewhat
unique, not so much in his international holdings or immense
financial strength but in the advantageous situation he created
for himself in Great Britain.5 5 None of Murdoch's British or U.S.
competitors has the potential to completely dominate the market
for the broadcast rights to a single sport throughout an entire
country. Rupert Murdoch may have that ability, and had the
outcome of this MMC investigation been more favorable, media
ownership of professional sports franchises may have been
into the
transformed from merely an unusual circumstance
56
prototypical arrangement and worldwide norm.
B. Background of the Attempted Takeover of United
Murdoch's bid was the largest takeover deal in the history of
sports and the first attempt by a broadcaster to purchase an
English football club. 5 7 The opportunity for the deal can be
traced back to June of 1991, when United was floated on the
Once United shares were made
London Stock Exchange. 5 8
public, Martin Edwards commenced a systematic withdrawal
from his position as the majority owner of the club, decreasing his
simultaneously increasing
ownership to just fourteen percent5 and
9
United's susceptibility to takeover.
Murdoch's broadcasting company, Sky, approached Edwards
last fall with an offer to purchase his fourteen percent, hoping to

54.
See Boehm, supra note 30; see also David Hardie, Shock GBP 160M
Swoop for Newcastle, EVENING NEWS (Edinburgh), Dec. 15, 1998, at 40.
See infra Part II.C.
55.
See supra note 44; see generally infra Part IV.
56.
See Harverson, supranote 29, at 95.
57.
See id. The flotation of professional football teams on the British
58.
See
market has been heavily criticized in the press and academic circles.
generally Brian R. Cheffins, Playing the Stock Market: "Going Public" and
Professional Team Sports, 24 IowA J. CORP. L. 641 (1999). The majority of sports
franchises worldwide which have offered shares to the public have been met with
mixed results. See generally id.; see also Market Savvy, Next Play Could be the
Fans if Yankees Net Offers Shares to Public, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1999, at 4.
See Harverson, supra note 29. By 1998, 62% of United's shares were
59.
owned by institutional investors, slightly over 20% by the fans, and the remainder
by executives at the club. See id. at 95.
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use Edwards's shares as a springboard to buy out the remaining
60
directors, who between them owned close to six percent.

However, the resultant combined twenty percent would still not
have given Sky control of the club, so Edwards had to persuade
United's Board of Directors to recommend the offer to the

remaining shareholders. 6 1 The decision to recommend, however,
was not a difficult one, as Murdoch's 240p a share final offer far
exceeded the 159p trading price at the time.6 2 Not only was the
takeover offer far too substantial to turn down, but the thought of
Murdoch turning to one of United's rivals with a similar offer was
63
a less than acceptable alternative.
C. Underlying Motivationsfor the Deal
The question arises why Murdoch would invest such an
extravagant sum and what return he could possibly expect from
such an investment. Although Murdoch's motives were clearly
profit-based, what was the underlying goal of purchasing United
and what would the impact be on the competitive framework in
which both Sky and United participate?
The answer lies in the fact that United's value to Murdoch
was not as a football club but as valuable programming
content 64-United produces something that people both in Great
Britain and abroad are willing to pay money to watch on
television. 65 Currently, United has to share its broadcast revenue
with nineteen other Premier League clubs. 6 6 The future, even in

60.
See id.
61.
See id.
62.
See id. As controlling shareholder, the only way Edwards could have
rejected the bid was to convince United's board (whose job it is to represent the
interests of all the shareholders) that the Sky offer was not in the best interests of
the club. See id. at 95-97.
63.
See id. at 97.
64.
See id.; see also Millar & Gibson, supra note 38. The modem media
market has been traditionally divided into three elements: content, carriage and
software. See infra notes 242-44. "Sky needs must-buy content, i.e. Premiership
football to convince viewers to subscribe, especially to its new 200-channel digital
service . . . . the broadcaster is betting substantial sums that digital satellite
broadcasting will take off, and the only way it knows to ensure that is by offering
some kind of unique football coverage." Millar & Gibson, supra note 38.
However, prior to the MMC ruling, the question still remained whether the
purchase of United's dominance on the field to ensure the success of Sky's
digitized service would result in an anti-competitive misuse of market power. See
Harverson, supra note 29, at 97.
65.
See Millar & Gibson, supra note 38.
66.
See Harverson, supra note 29, at 97. In fact, "United receives about
seven percent of the BSkyB pot, when its share of aggregate attendance would
justify three times as much." Gledhill, supra note 37. Spanish powerhouse
Barcelona recently negotiated a five-year deal authorizing Spanish cable company
Via Digital the rights to show its games for a staggering £ 254 million. See id. The
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light of the RPC ruling, has the potential to be quite different with
clubs able to sell 7the television rights to their home games to
6
anyone they wish.
By purchasing United, Murdoch could not only have
guaranteed his broadcasting system the nation's most valuable
sports programming content but also could have acquired a seat
on both sides of the bargaining table for future broadcasting
rights. Thus, following a change in circumstances, in which Sky
either (1) might not remain the exclusive broadcaster of the entire
Premiership 68 or (2) was not allowed to retain those exclusive
rights, 6 9 Murdoch would have assured himself that Sky, as owner
of United, either would have a substantial bargaining edge in
bidding for the new contract, or the pay-per-view future of the
Premier League (or at least that of United) would become an

consensus is that United could receive at least a comparable sum if it were
allowed to negotiate its own individual deal rather than share in the Premier
League contract. See id.
67.
The RPC did not prohibit the selling of broadcasting rights, individually
or non-exclusively, but merely found that exclusive, collective arrangements were
neither anti-competitive nor violative of the public interest. For a discussion of
the issues and considerations facing the RPC, see generally Gledhill, supra note
37; Boehm, supra note 30. "[T]here is also talk of setting up a European soccer
superleague, in which Man U would join a handful of lucrative continental peers.
In such a scenario, BSkyB would also have the upper hand, in that-as a major
Eurocaster as well as a club owner-it would sit on both sides of any TV rights
negotiations." Boehm, supranote 30.
68.
In the first instance, motivation for Murdoch lay in the fact that Sky's
contract to broadcast the Premiership matches expires at the end of next season,
creating an obvious incentive to try to lock in Sky, either as the broadcaster of the
entire Premiership again or of only the most watched matches-those involving
United. See id.; see also Millar & Gibson, supra note 38. "Since 1992, Sky has
parted with enormous amounts of cash to secure exclusive live television rights for
Premiership matches, but a new revolution is about to unfold. The Premier
League contract has only one full season left to run after the present one, and the

consensus in the industry is that after 2001, the biggest clubs will go it alone."
Millar & Gibson, supranote 38; see also Boehm, supranote 30. "Acquiring United
is an ace up the sleeve for future rights negotiations, in that it will be difficult for
other teams not to follow in the commercial footsteps taken by the leading club.
Manchester United is already partnered with BSkyB in MUTV, the team's digital
TV channel that will launch as part of BSkyB's Sky Digital platform on October 1."
Boehm, supra note 30.
69.
Under the second scenario, impetus lay in the inquiry then underway
in the Restrictive Practices Court concerning the Premier League itself. See
Larsen, supra note 39. If the OFT had prevailed in having the Premiership judged
a cartel, which would have barred the League from further collective bargaining,
all the clubs would have been free to negotiate their broadcasting deals
individually. See id. In such an event, Sky's current broadcasting deal with the
League would be voided, but Sky (acting as both club owner and broadcaster)
could immediately have begun offering a pay-per-view coverage system solely for
United. See Millar & Gibson, supra note 38.

1999]

THE VERTICAL INTEGRATION OFMEDIA AND SPORTS 1461

immediate reality with Sky as a major participant in that
70
reality.
Thus, in a sense, Murdoch's takeover bid was an attempt to
strike preemptively and provide Sky with an insurance policy. By
acquiring United, Sky would have been protected either at the
true expiration of its contract with the Premiership or in the event
that the current deal was voided by the RPC. Under either
scenario, Sky would have been positioned to retain a substantial
edge in bargaining power to negotiate new arrangements. 7 1 The
implications of this power to control and shape the entire British

football and football broadcasting industries in large part created
the threat to competition and to the public interest that was
perceived by the MMC as too dangerous to permit such a merger
to go forward. 7 2
D. The MMC and RPC Decisions-CoextensiveImplications
The resulting effects of the United takeover, had it been
permitted, could not have been limited to United and the large
clubs alone. Further implications would resound throughout the
sports and broadcasting markets. If United were able to negotiate
its own deal, either at the expiration of the current contract or

70.
According to a report published last year by the sports consultants
Oliver & Ohlbaum, there are eighteen million football fans in England and Wales,
all of whom, Sky thinks, could be persuaded to watch more matches featuring
their favorite team. See Hilary Curtis, The Price of Always Playing at Home,
GUARDIAN, Feb. 22, 1999, at 6. Pay-per-view is predicted by the report to bring in
£ 280 million annually for Premiership clubs by the 2003-2004 season. See id.
Clubs could earn a further £ 240 million from selling a television 'season ticket'offering a package of 60 live games a season to their fans. See id. That compares
with the £135 million the entire Premiership receives from Sky for live rights this
year. See infra notes 211-18 (discussing problems arising from the similar 'season
ticket' approach in America).
See Millar & Gibson, supra note 38.
71.

72.

See id.

Sky is, and is likely to remain, the only broadcaster with the capacity
to offer true pay-per-view football. In May, the 20 top-flight clubs rejected
Sky's pay-per-view proposition for the current season, but it is widely
accepted that this was only a temporary setback.
Given that the Premier League chairmen have already acknowledged,
at least in private, that pay-per-view is the only way forward, it must be of
concern to know that their lead force will be on both sides of the

negotiating table-a factor which will become even more important after
the likely demise of the current collective deal between the league and Sky.
Id.
But see infra notes 287-94 and accompanying text (detailing arguments before
the RPC). Sky's consistent argument has been that United is but one of twenty
Premier League teams and that a two-thirds majority of those clubs is required to
approve any new broadcasting arrangement. See id.; see also Came et al., supra
note 4.
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upon that contract's nullification by the RPC, the other clubswith the exception of those few which might also have been
purchased by media groups-would likely have been forced to
acquiesce 3to United's position and sign into a pay-per-view deal
7
with Sky.

While the RPC case might potentially have had more
immediate implications for British football and broadcasting than
the United transaction, 74 the two decisions were ultimately
coextensive-the eventual ramifications of each hinged on the
other's outcome.7 5 An RPC decision voiding collective deals
would have opened the door for extensive vertical integration of
teams by media companies seeking to purchase rather than rent
their own programming content. An MMC decision denying the
rights of media entities to purchase football clubs, however,
would have had just the opposite effect.
Although the two investigations seem somewhat at odds with
each other, together the RPC and the MMC were in a unique
position: they had the opportunity to either (1) open the door
wide, allowing media groups to purchase their own sports
programming content, (2) slam it shut in the name of free
competition, or (3) perhaps find some compromise position
between the full acceptance and complete prohibition of the
integration of sports and media.7 6 The MMC started the ball
rolling by recommending the prohibition of Sky's purchase of
United. However, it is yet to be seen how other attempted
alliances between clubs and broadcasters will be treated by the
7
new British antitrust authorities. 7

73.
See Millar & Gibson, supra note 38.
74.
See Gledhill, supranote 37.
75.
See id. In fact, Murdoch probably never would have bid such a price
for United if he had not been concerned that his current stranglehold over the
rights to broadcast Premier League matches was nearing its end. See id.
76.
See infra Part IV.
77.
There remains confusion among analysts as to whether the blocking of
the Sky-United merger precludes all takeovers of football clubs by broadcasters.
Michael Crick, spokesman for Shareholders United Against Murdoch (SUAM) and
ardent opponent of the Sky bid, claimed that "[t]he MMC and the Government
have established the principle not that just Rupert Murdoch should not own
United but that no other TV company should own a football club either." Brian
Roberts, et al., Sky Falls on Murdoch Utd, MIRROR, Apr. 10, 1999, at 1. The fact
that the NTL-Newcastle bid was also referred to the Competition Commission

lends further validity to this position. See infra note 162. However, this issueessentially the ultimate precedential weight to be accorded the MMC's
conclusion-is the most compelling question arising out of the whole transaction,
especially in light of substantial contrary Continental practice.
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III. THE GOVERNMENTAL INQUIRY

The opportunity possessed collectively by the RPC and MMC
to determine the future of sports and sports broadcasting in
England originated in the structure and policies underlying the
British antitrust authority. The general nature of the British
antitrust system, and the MMC's structure and responsibilities in
particular, served to create a competition authority that was
especially suited to handling politically controversial business
transactions with potential anti-competitive effects. 78 However,
recently enacted legislation rendered the referral of the United
of the Commission's last and most
matter to the MMC one
79
important investigations.
A. The British Antitrust System Generally
Antitrust law generally considers whether government
intervention to control business concentration and economic
power is necessary to preserve free competition. 80 The British
government, however, has traditionally utilized a rather unusual
system for determining when, whether, and how to intervene in
everyday business transactions. Despite, or perhaps because of,
this unusual structure, the British system was very successful
and prescient, and great value was placed on the
recommendations of the three individual branches: (1) the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, (2) the Office of Fair
Trading, and (3) the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 8 ' One
of the most unusual attributes of the British system was that
while such a tripartite division of responsibility was maintained
(along with a large, high-quality investigative staff), a tremendous

78.
79.

See infra Parts III.A. and III.B.
See infra Part III.C.

The British antitrust system, with a few notable exceptions, is based on
80.
American antitrust tradition. Under U.S. law, the traditional antitrust goal is to
protect competition in order to permit the free market system to function properly.
See SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, supranote 17, at 1-2. Monopolistic abuse of
market power by one entity, or concerted action by competitors, often can skew
market outcomes and distort the market's otherwise theoretically efficient
allocation. See id. As a general matter, antitrust law seeks to prevent such anticompetitive practices, either through private cause of action or governmental
intervention, in order to allow a competitive market to guide the development of
business and industry. See id.
These divisions making up the tripartite structure of the British
81.
antitrust authority are each individually analyzed in the sections following. See
Parts III.A. and III.B.
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amount of power was, in the end, allocated to one presiding
82
figure, the Secretary of State.
Due to the introduction of a new Competition Commission,
however, in the Spring of 1999, some of the procedural and
substantive characteristics of the British system have been
significantly altered. 8 3
Prior to the introduction of the new

Competition Commission, the traditional investigative process
followed the procedure outlined below.

1. An Overview of the Traditional Investigative Process
The initial phase of all anti-competitive review began with the
Office of Fair Trading (OFT).8 4 Under the traditional framework,
the OFT made the preliminary determination as to whether a
certain deal was potentially violative of the public interest or
breached any competition laws.8 5 The Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry made the next decision based on the OFT's
analysis.8 6 The Secretary determined whether the transaction

82.
See A. Nigel Parr, Avoiding a Second Stage Inquiry by Giving Conduct
Undertakings:Recent Changes to United Kingdom Merger Control, ANTITRUST Spring
1996, at 31. The structure of the three administrative bodies primarily reflects a
desire to achieve a separation of powers between the detection and investigation
of, the power of decision over, and the regulation of mergers and other business
conduct. See id.; see also Alissa A. Meade, Note, Modeling a EuropeanCompetition
Authority, 46 DUKE L.J. 153, 178 (Oct. 1996) (explaining that political review
ultimately rests with the Secretary of State, while most judicial appeals in
competition are sent to the RPC); Alan Watkins, The Inns of Court Are Set to Flow
with Fine Wines, INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 13, 1998, at 25 ("[w]hether you call
them quasi-judicial exercises or exercises in ministerial discretion is largely a
matter of taste. The most important are taken by Mr. Peter Mandelson, [the
Secretary of State who referred the United takeover to the MMC and since
resigned] who possesses powers of terrifying extent over references to the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the functions of the Office of Fair Trading
and much else. He can propose or dispose, accept or reject, . . . a consequence of
what Parliament has passed, principally an Act of 1973.").
The procedures applicable only to the traditional system involving the MMC
(and not the new system involving the Competition Commission) will, when
possible, be referred to in the past tense. The emphasis of this Note will be on this
traditional form of investigation and evaluation as conducted by the MMC.
83.
See infra Part III.C.
84.
See Parr, supra note 82, at 31. The OFT gathers information about
monopolies and mergers, acts as the British competition authority internationally,
works with the Commission on EU matters, advises the Secretary of State in
merger regulation, and reports to the Secretary of State on the status of
competition in Great Britain. See id. Even though the OFT is ostensibly an
apolitical institution, due to the wide range of areas in which it has competence,
the OFT quite often plays a greater role in competition matters than its advisory
role might suggest. See id.
85.
See Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Statutory Responsibilities
(visited Nov. 15, 1999), <http://www.mmc.gov.U.K./rolel.htm> [hereinafter
Monopolies and Mergers Commission]; see also Parr,supra note 82, at 31.
86.
See Parr, supra note 82, at 31.
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should be allowed to proceed without further delay or if it instead
87
should be referred to the MMC.
Following a referral to the MMC and its investigation and
evaluation, the matter was returned once again to the Secretary
for a final decision. 8 8 Only in certain circumstances was the
Secretary
obliged
to
accept
or
enforce
the
MMC's
recommendations. 8 9 Although possessing the ultimate decisionmaking authority, the Secretary's discretion was initially tied to
the OFT's preliminary investigation and heavily guided by the
9°
MMC's subsequent recommendation.
2. The Office of Fair Trading and the Director General of Fair
Trading
The OFT is a non-ministerial, independent government
department that is separated into competition policy and
consumer affairs divisions. 9 1 Established twenty-five years ago,
the OFT is heavily involved in both ensuring consumers' welfare
and enforcing competition policy.9 2 In addition to its role in
conditioning or halting trade practices that are contrary to
consumers' interests, the OFT has the somewhat dichotomous
(but traditional antitrust) goals of encouraging free competition
and intervening in industry practices found to be anti93
competitive.
On top of its domestic duties, the OFT has international
responsibilities, including maintaining relations with the
94
European Commission on Continental competition dilemmas.
In order for European law to figure prominently in OFT
investigations in the United Kingdom, however, certain threshold
requirements must be satisfied. 95 Such thresholds were not met
by the Sky-United transaction and as a result, European law was
96
essentially inapplicable.
The Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT), the head of the
OFT, has generalized responsibilities in reviewing competition

87.
supranote
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Monopolies and Mergers Commission, supra note 85; see also Parr,
82, at 31.
See infra Part III.A.3.
See Parr, supra note 82, at 32.
See id. at 31-32.
See id. at 31.
See id.
See id.
See Meade, supranote 82.
See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
See id.
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matters. 9 7 In addition to the duties preceding referral to the
MMC, the DGFT and OFT staff also handle the negotiation of
undertakings and the monitoring of the operation of any
undertakings given or orders made following an adverse MMC
report on a monopoly, merger, or anti-competitive practice. 98
The OFT's initial decision to investigate the United deal was
virtually obligatory, as any acquisitions that exceeded the £70
million threshold received automatic review by the OFT.9 9 The
investigation by this competition division lasted a month. 10 0
Upon the completion of the OFT's investigation, the DGFT made a
final assessment that was then sent on to the Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry. 10 1
3. The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
If, after examining the OFT's report, the Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry determined that the proposed merger or
acquisition worked against the public interest, 10 2 the Secretary
would automatically pass the report to on to the MMC.' 0 3 The
MMC then would conduct a more broad and thorough
10 4
investigation,
Under the Fair Trade Act,' 0 s the Secretary was empowered to
refer any merger that satisfies the Act's jurisdictional

97.
See Monopolies and Merger Commission, supra note 85. The Director
General of Fair Trading occupies the focal point in the British competition law.
See Parr, supranote 82.
98.
See Monopolies and Merger Commission, supra note 85. An alternative
to the reference of a merger to the MMC exists in the acceptance of undertakings,
concessions as to the future behavior of the merged entity. See infra note 259
(questioning the effectiveness of concessions in the Sky transaction).
99.
See Parr, supra note 82, at 32. The United transaction involved an
exchange of £625 million. See supranote 33.
The only other Premiership clubs currently meeting this threshold requirement
are Arsenal and Newcastle United. See David Gow, Net Raised on MergerInquiries,
GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 7, 1999, at 19. Alternatives to this "assets" test are
discussed infra note 161 and accompanying text.

100.

See Murdoch Meets Man Utd, Is Mandelson a Match for Murdock, BBC

NEWS, Sept. 9, 1998 (visited Nov. 6, 1999) <http://news.bbc.co.uk> (search by
title in quotations).
See Meade, supra note 82, at 178 (stating that the OFT "heavily
101.
influences" the Secretary of State).
102. See infra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of
public interest).
103. See infra Part III.B.
104. See Parr,supranote 82, at 31.
105. See supranote 82 and accompanying text. In practice, this has meant
that a reference will probably be made where a merger is likely to confer an
enhanced degree of market power on the merged company enabling it to act to the
detriment of its customers or suppliers and ultimately the consumer, in terms of
price and choice. See id.; see also infra note 113.

1999]

THE VERTICAL INTEGRATION OF MEDIA AND SPORTS 1467

requirements to the MMC for a detailed investigation.10 6 This
wide discretion to make merger references was limited during the
last fifteen years, however, by a number of ministerial statements
to the effect that references would be made primarily, though not
exclusively, on competition grounds. 10 7
Following an adverse
MMC report on a monopoly, merger, or anti-competitive practice,
the Secretary had the further responsibility of determining what
action the government would ultimately take in relation to the
08
MMC's recommendation.1
The power to evaluate and take action based on the OFT's
and MMC's recommendations clearly provided the Secretary with
the greatest decisionmaking ability under the traditional British
antitrust system. The broad discretion inherent in such a
position, however, recently came under scrutiny as a needless
and dangerous infiltration of politics into an otherwise objective
administrative process. 10 9 Although some de facto restraints
were implemented, the Secretary still retained virtually complete
authority to refer all forms of mergers and acquisitions and, in
rare instances, monopolies to the MMC. 110
As evidenced by the above described responsibilities of the
OFT and Secretary, the substantive and procedural hurdles that
a transaction had to overcome to avoid referral to the MMC were
rigorous. Yet underlying much of this procedure and the MMC's
subsequent analysis was the rather subjective-and inevitably
political-standard of the public interest.1 1 '

106.
107.

See Parr, supranote 82, at 32.
See id.

If the MMC concludes by at least a two-thirds majority that a merger is
likely to operate against the public interest, the Secretary of State has the
discretion to prohibit it or permit it to proceed either conditionally or
unconditionally. If however, the MMC concludes that the merger is not
likely to operate against the public interest, the Secretary of State is
unable to prevent it from proceeding.

Id.
108.
See id.
109.
See infra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing changes made to
remove politics and ministerial discretion from the merger analysis).
110.
See Parr,supra note 82, at31.
111.
Public interest is an ambiguous legal term with significant political
overtones. The political aspects of the construction of public interest in the
merger referral process became especially apparent in the controversy
surrounding Sky's attempted takeover of United.
See infra, Part III.D.
Commentators have often described the MMC's rationale for its investigation as
"couched in vague terms." Meade, supranote 82, at 180.
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B. The Structure and Responsibilities of the MMC
The MMC was first set up as the Monopolies and Restrictive
Practices Commission by the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
(Inquiry and Control) Act 1948, but it ceased to be responsible for
restrictive practices in 1956. 112 The Commission's most recent
title and duties originated from the Fair Trading Act 1973 (FTA),
which set forth the MMC's responsibilities to investigate and
report on matters referred to it relating to mergers, monopolies
and anti-competitive practices, the regulation of utilities, and the
performance of public sector bodies. 113
1. Authority of the MMC
The MMC had no power of its own to initiate inquiries or to
choose which inquiries to undertake. 1 14 As discussed above, the
Commission was merely one of a number of authorities with
responsibilities under British competition law. The MMC was
thus dependent on the OFT/DGFT and the Secretary to set forth
matters for investigation. 1 1 5
Upon the referral of such a matter, it was the MMC's
responsibility to determine whether the referred matter operated
or could be expected to operate against the public interest and to
report its conclusions to the Secretary.1 1 6 In the case of an

112.

See Monopolies and Mergers Commission, supra note 85.

Three

principle statutes regulate British competition law: the Fair Trading Act 1973
(FTA), which regulates mergers and monopolies; the Competition Act 1980, which
regulates anti-competitive practices; and the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976,
which regulates restrictive agreements and cartels. See Parr, supra note 82, at
32.
113. See Fair Trading Act 1973, § 3, Part II (Performance of the Functions of
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission) (U.K.) available in LEXIS UK Library,
Stat File; see also Monopolies and Mergers Commission, supranote 85.
114. The MMC was established by statute to investigate and report on
matters referred to it relating to mergers, monopolies, and anti-competitive
practices. See id; see also Meade, supra note 82, at 178. The MMC had no
original jurisdiction, but was given the power to conduct investigations under
various British laws (the FTA, the Competition Act 1980, the Telecommunications
Act 1984, the Airports Act 1986, the Gas Act 1986, the Electricity Act 1989, the
Broadcasting Act 1990, and the Water Industry Act 1991). See Meade, supra, at
178.
115,
See id. at 179. "While the MMC is an independent institution, it is
technically subordinate to the DGFT [Director General of Fair Trading], who is
officially charged with acquiring and reviewing all information on mergers and
monopolies in Great Britain. In practice, however, the MMC's opinions have
proven to be accurate and influential despite its lack of enforcement powers." Id.
Much of the MMC's present success derives from the quality of its work and from
the relationship it shares with the OFT. See id.
116. See Parr,supranote 82, at 32.
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adverse report, the MMC recommended how, if at all, the
117
identified detrimental aspects of a matter could be remedied.
In investigating the effect of a merger on the public interest,
the MMC was required by Section 84 of the FTA to take into
account "all matters which appear to them in the particular
circumstances to be relevant and, in particular; [1] the promotion
of effective competition, [2] the interests of consumers, [3] the
development of new techniques and products and new market
entry, and [4] the promotion of a balanced distribution of industry
and employment in the U.K.. " 118 In practice, however, the effect
of the merger on competition was typically the most important
aspect of the MMC's analysis. 119
2. Composition of the MMC
Although its tasks were relatively straightforward, the MMC's
approach to carrying out those tasks was rather unusual, due in
large part to the .composition of the MMC itself. The Chairman
and members of the MMC were appointed by the Secretary, who
was responsible for overall competition policy. 120
With the
exception of the Chairman, all members were part-time. 12 1 There
were as many as fifty members on the MMC at any one time,
although the actual number typically fell between thirty and
thirty-five. 122 Members were usually appointed for an initial term
of three years and remained eligible for reappointment. 123
3. Impact of European Law on the MMC
While the MMC members usually became experts in the
various domestic industries and in each industry's unique
propensity for anti-competitive activity, they had to develop a
working knowledge of Europe-wide competition law, issues, and
practices as well. 12 4 As noted above in discussing the OFT's
duties, European Community (EC) competition law may

117.
See id.
118. Fair Trading Act 1973, § 84, supra note 113; see also Parr, supra note
82, at 32.
119.

See Parr, supranote 82, at 32.

120.
121.
122.

See Monopolies and Mergers Commission, supranote 85.
See id.
See id. The MMC is comprised of full time civil servants drawn from

industry, the professions, academia, trade unions, and retail businesses. See
Meade, supra note 82, at 179. This relatively unique make-up in the world of

antitrust authorities may have aided the MMC in accumulating the many diverse
opinions it accepted regarding the United transaction.
123.
124.

See Monopolies and Mergers Commission, supra note 85.
See id.

1470

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:1445

sometimes be relevant to the resolution of anti-competitive
125
matters within the United Kingdom.
The main EC competition laws of relevance to the MMC's
work were Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome and the
regulation on the control of mergers. 12 6 Article 85(1) prohibits all
agreements and concerted practices that may affect trade
between member states and that have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the
Article 86 prohibits the undertaking or
common market. 127
abusing of a dominant position which an entity enjoys in so far as
it may affect trade between member states. 128 Although it was
not the MMC's function to determine whether an agreement or
practice was contrary to Article 85 or 86, the Commission
typically took account of EC law, where relevant, in the course of
its investigations. 129
One EC regulation often considered by the MMC in the
context of large corporate transactions was Regulation 4064/89,
which came into force in late September of 1990.130 Under this
regulation, mergers with a "Community dimension" are subject to
13 1
the exclusive jurisdiction of the European Commission.
Essentially, this Community dimension concept implicated
mergers or acquisitions involving parties with a combined
worldwide turnover of more than five billion ecu (approximately
£4.2 billion) and subjected them to the control of the European
Commission. 13 2 Those mergers not caught by the EC merger
33
regulation remain subject to national competition law. 1
As a result, the EC competition law was not invoked by the
MMC in its consideration of the United takeover, which involved
only £625 million. 13 4 Ironically, although the Sky-United merger

125.

See id.

126. See id.; see also Merger Control in Europe: The Main Provisions of EC
Regulation, 4064/89, DTI Publications (available from DTI Publications, Admail
528, London, SWIS 8YT) cited in Monopolies and Mergers Commission, supra note
85.
127. See Monopolies and Mergers Commission, supra note 85. Exemptions
can be granted to certain transactions under Article 85(3). See id.
128.
129.

See id.
See id.

130, See id.
131. Id. However, some mergers with a Community dimension may be
reviewed by the national authorities. See id. Under Article 9 of the regulation, a
member state can ask the European Commission to refer a merger back to its
national competition authorities for investigation. See id. In such cases, the
member state must demonstrate to the Commission that the merger threatens to
create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition
would be significantly impeded in a distinct market in the member state. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See supra notes 33 and 131 and accompanying text.
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did not meet the monetary threshold for EC jurisdiction, the
economic

and

competitive

implications

created

by

the

transaction, had it been permitted, could have had a Continental
impact quite disparate with the transaction's relatively small
size.

l3 5

An interesting dilemma would have arisen had a Continental
media conglomerate attempted to take over a British football club.
While an MMC recommendation with the subsequent assent of
the Secretary of State clearly could stop a British media group
from taking over a British football club, significant tensions
between the British government and the European Union (EU)
would likely develop should a Continental media conglomerate
13 6
attempt such a merger with an English Premier League team.
Such a transaction would then presumably fall outside Great
Britain's jurisdiction, and, due to the more liberal position of the
Continental nations on media ownership of football clubs, the
British position prohibiting such ownership might be overruled by
an EU decision.' 3 7 On the other hand, the fact that the MMC's

135. While no European law was truly implicated in the MMC's
consideration of the attempted takeover of United, individual European countries
have interpreted the risks posed by such an integration of sports and media quite
differently. See infra Part V. Further, although the United transaction itself was
not sufficiently large to trigger European involvement, the RPC's analysis of Sky's
collective broadcasting arrangement with the Premier League was much closer to
implicating EU regulations and policy. See infra Part V.B. (discussing RPC
decision and the value of Sky's contract with the Premier League).
The European Union has clearly signaled its intention of greater involvement
in regulating television companies that obtain the exclusive rights to broadcast
sporting events for longer than a year. See Analysis: Regulating Sport of Europe's
TV Channels, BBC's WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Apr. 16, 1999. Karel Van Miert, the
EU Commissioner for Competition, prior to the outcome of the RPC case, voiced
his opinion that long-term sports contracts are likely to be outlawed, unless
"demonstrably good" reasons can be shown for such deals. See id. "BSkyB got
five years of rights in Britain because there was an emerging market. In the
future, exclusivity periods will not be sanctioned without scrutiny if they exceed a
year." Europe Plans to Join the Sky Wars (visited Aug. 12,
1999)
<http://www.soccemet.com/english/news/ENG- 102-12899.htm>
(website no
longer accessible, copy of the document is on file with the author). In response,
television companies have argued that they need long-term contracts to justify
large investments in rights and programming, while they also provide sports
bodies with assured revenue flows. See id.
136.
See Tony Fraher, Media Groups Still Hope to Net Football Clubs; A
Change in Britain's CompetitionLaw and a Challenge at the European Commission
May Open the Way for Sky to Try Again, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 15, 1999, at
6 (Business).
137.
A similar scenario might arise in the context of the RPC decision as
well. For a discussion of the arguments presented in this dispute, see infra notes
287-94 and accompanying text. The decision of the RPC to uphold the legality of
Sky's collective arrangement with the Premier League was at odds with the EC and
European nations' competition authorities which have in policy if not in practice
condemned this type of arrangement. See infra notes 239-45 and accompanying
text.
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conclusion in the United transaction cut in sharp contrast to the
current European view on media-sports integration may serve to
reopen Continental debate on this issue.
C. The New Competition Act

With the introduction of the new Competition Act, the nature
and structure of the British competition authority has
significantly changed since the investigation of the United
transaction.1 3 8
As a result, the specific functions and
characteristics of the MMC are no longer completely relevant to
any new predictive analysis. However, these recent changes did
not impact the MMC's procedures during the course of its
investigation or alter the value of the MMC's determination as to
Sky's purchase of United.1 3 9 Moreover, as the goal of the new
regime is to build on the best attributes of the MMC in guiding
British competition law into the next millennium, the United
investigation remains important and will inevitably serve as a
model for similar future inquiries. 14 °
In late 1998, the Chairman of the MMC announced the
introduction of a new Competition Act, praising it as "an overdue
and significant toughening of U.K. competition law." 14 1

Under

the Competition Act, the new Competition Commission replaced
the MMC on April 1, 1999 and took over its functions, including

A European Commission ruling on such collective selling--which has already
been challenged in Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Germany, France, and Greecewould take precedence over a contradictory British decision. See Fraher, supra
note 136. "Add to all of this the fact that the Restrictive Practices Act, under
which the Premier League case was heard, is due to disappear in March next year,
to be replaced by the Competition Act that is far more Euro-friendly, and the
potential for a complete overturn of the current situation with the Premier League
increases very significantly." Id.
138.
See Monopolies and Mergers Commission, MMC Chairman Welcomes
Toughening of U.K. Competition Law (visited Dec. 3, 1998) <http://www.mmc.
gov.uk/news2.htm> (speech of Dr. Derek Morris-Chairman of the MMC) (website
no longer accessible, copy of document on file with author).
139.
See id.
140.
See infra note 162 and accompanying text. Although many of Sky's
rival broadcasters were awaiting the green light from the MMC to purchase their
own Premier League clubs, the Commissions red light recommendation on the
United deal did not necessarily rule out the merger of less dominant entities in the
two industries. See id. As a result, NTL (England's third largest broadcaster) and
Newcastle United (a top British club) had pushed forward with their merger
negotiations until their merger was also referred to the Competition Commission.
See id. Soon after, NTL chose not to exercise its option to buy a majority stake in
the club. See id. Apparently, it was clear to NTL that, even though the new
Competition Commission would be conducting the inquiry, it was unlikely that a
conclusion different from the MMC's would be reached so soon after the denial of
the Sky-United merger.
141.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, MMC Chairman Welcomes
Toughening of U.K. Competition Law, supra note 138.
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Fair Trading Act inquiries into mergers and monopolies. 142 The
new Competition Commission also has the power to hear appeals
against decisions made by the Director General of Fair Trading or
sectoral regulators under the prohibition provisions of the new
Act. 143
In the course of its reform, the new Competition Act makes
an important distinction between (1) fines on and prohibitions of
anti-competitive agreements and the abuse of a dominant
position and (2) structural issues relating to mergers and
monopolies in which a prohibition regime is now viewed as
inappropriate. 14 4 Among the further distinctions between the
traditional role of the MMC and the new role of the Competition
Commission's appeal tribunals are that (1) the tribunals' role is
not investigatory, (2) the tribunals are subject to European
jurisprudence rather than ministerial discretion, (3) the criteria
the tribunals apply are not those under the public interest
provisions of the Fair Trading Act, and (4) the tribunals may
145
ultimately operate on different timescales than the MMC used.
As a result of these changes, the investigation by the MMC of
Murdoch's attempted acquisition was one of its last. Although
the efficacy of the MMC's final determination was not undermined
by the new agency structure, it was initially unclear as a direct
result of these changes whether future controversies such as
those surrounding the United transaction would receive the
diligent and expert review normally accorded by the MMC to such
matters. Although the new Act may be much more Euro-friendly,
it might possibly allow potentially anti-competitive transactions to
go through unreviewed because of (1) the new Commission's
willingness to defer to European precedent, (2) the exclusion of
ministerial and political involvement in the process, and (3) the
refusal to consider such transactions in light of the broad public
interest standard.
While the United matter exposed most of these alleged
deficiencies in the traditional MMC approach, it may have been
exactly those deficiencies that allowed for such an intriguing and
thoughtful review of a merger that apparently possessed farranging anti-competitive ramifications. 1 4 6 Thus, although the
structure and responsibilities of the new British competition

142.
143.

See id.
See id.

144.
145.

See id.
See id.

146.
The referral to the MMC was made in large part as a result of the
political uproar the attempted takeover created around Great Britain and also due
to the vague parameters of the public interest that could be harmed by the

merger. See supra note 107 (discussing the public interest standard); infra Part
III.D.
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authority will be dramatically different from the MMC's, the
heightened political climate and diverse economic concerns
surrounding the United transaction will likely make the MMC's
recommendation a landmark decision and exceedingly difficult to
overturn or stray from in subsequent proceedings brought before
1 47
the new Competition Commission and its tribunals.
D. The PoliticalDebate
Another set of issues raised by the United transaction were
the political controversies surrounding the OFT's, MMC's, and
Secretary's decisions. Murdoch alleged the referral by the OFT
and Secretary to the MMC was politically motivated-an attempt
by the new majority Labour Party to appear publicly willing to

stand up to Murdoch, whose newspapers' support of the Party
had been influential in putting Labour in power in the past
election. 148
Further, a growing political backlash developed amongst the
general public against the United takeover. 149 Major attacks
against the transaction were launched from a variety of angles
when the MMC made itself available to comments from interested
parties. 150
The debate over the referral was complicated additionally by
Peter Mandelson, the Secretary at that time, who was openly
known to be close friends with Elizabeth Murdoch, Sky's network
manager and the daughter of majority shareholder Rupert

147.
See infra Part III.D. In fact, one of the new Competition Commission's
first referrals was the proposed merger between NTL and Newcastle United. See
infra note 162 and accompanying text.
148.
See Alderson et al., supra note 31 (explaining Murdoch's relationship
with the Labour party).
149.
See Potter, supra note 17.
150. Among the most strenuous and well-reasoned protests were those
offered by:
(1) A December report from the government sponsored Football Taskforce
on the commercialization of the game based on the fan's views of how stock
market floatations of clubs have affected the sport;
(2) An influential academic conference in London, led by Professor
Jonathan Michie, a member of Shareholders United Against Murdoch
(SUAM) and consisting of various economists, accountants, and
competition experts; and
(3) Representations to the MMC by other clubs, organizations, and
individuals opposing the deal, which include among them the Independent

Television Commission (ITC), the U.K.'s commercial television regulator,

which informed the MMC that it felt mergers such as Sky/United would
impede the sale of broadcast rights.
Murdoch Critics Unite on Sky Bid, OBSERVER (London), Nov.

(Business).

1, 1998, at 1
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Murdoch. i 51 Mandelson ultimately resigned due to other political
difficulties just after the new year and was replaced by Stephen
Byers.
Before leaving office, however, Mandelson had ordered his
officials to draw up a paper that would examine ways of placing
merger referrals outside the political arena.1 5 2 Under the system
in place at the time, Mandelson was advised whether to refer a

large merger to the MMC by the Director General of the OFT John
Bridgeman, but, as noted above, Mandelson was free to ignore
such advice.1 5 3 Further, if such a merger went on to the MMC,
Mandelson was also free to ignore the MMC's ultimate
recommendation unless the MMC advised him that the merger
should go ahead without conditions.1S4
Ironically, at the end of the day, Mandelson himself chose the
politically savvy approach to his duties by referring the matter in
the name of public interest to the MMC. By passing the matter
on to the MMC, Mandelson headed off a political uproar-almost
forty Labour Members of Parliament had already signed a
Commons' motion calling for an inquiry by the MMC. l 5s
An additional political issue raised by the United transaction
was the inherent vagueness of the public interest standard, which
perhaps enabled a matter to reach the MMC that might not
otherwise have been referred. Reports suggested that although
the OFT originally saw no competition grounds for referring Sky's
bid to the MMC, it changed its recommendation under pressure
from officials at the Department of Trade and Industry and the
56
Department for Media, Culture, and Sport.1
However, while the intense political turmoil surrounding
Sky's attempted takeover of United may have exerted more
influence than warranted on the referral process, the political

151.

See David Walker, Ambiguous Roles Mean Muddle, GUARDIAN (London),

Dec. 23, 1998.
152.

See Nicholas Watt, Mandelson Aims to Take Mergers out of Politics,

GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 30, 1998, at 9. Mandelson said his instinct was to take
decisions about mergers away from politicians who often faced criticism for

showing favoritism to business friends. See id. "Iwant to put everything under
the microscope. I want to test whether the way we do things in Britain is the best
we can do." Id.; see also Murdoch Critics Unite on Sky Bid, supra note 150.
153.
See supra Part III.A.3.
154.
See Watt, supranote 152.
155.
See id. Additionally, more than five hundred individuals and groups
bombarded the MMC with objections, the most ever against a British takeover.
See Brian Roberts et al., Sky Falls on Murdoch Utd; Tycoon Rocked as his Old
Trafford Takeover Bid Blocked, MIRROR (London), Apr. 10, 1999, at 1, 11.
156.
See id. This view is supported by the fact that John Bridgeman, the
OFT's Director General, pointed to the public interest issues raised by the bid as a
reason for recommending an MMC reference. See id. The OFT normally makes its
decisions purely on competition grounds, leaving it to the government to decide on
the public interest matters. See id.
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controversy ultimately may have been invaluable both preceding
and during the actual MMC investigation. First, without such
political involvement, a merger in an area so important to the
general public but which raised only dubious competition
concerns might not otherwise have been forced to undergo any
government scrutiny whatsoever. Second, it was only through
i5 7
the unprecedented publicizing of the Sky-United issues letter
and the resulting forum created for both public and private
opinion on the matter that the MMC was able to thoroughly
evaluate the circumstances under which the transaction should
be permitted or prohibited and thereby discern the true public
interest.
E. Structuraland PoliticalImpact on the MMC's Decision
Many critics have suggested that no better argument exists
for depoliticizing merger policy than the United matter itself, as
Secretary of State Byers was faced with the choice of blocking the
deal and displeasing Murdoch, who controls substantial British
press influence or letting it through and displeasing most football

fans and many members of the British Parliament.15 8

The new Competition Commission offers numerous subtle
changes that attempt to either alleviate or extricate the dangers
posed by such political involvement in the antitrust review
However, a concern remains that, without such
process.' 5 9
political involvement, business trends with effects potentially
detrimental to fair competition and to the public interest 60 may
be overlooked and not accorded any sort of thorough or wellreasoned review and analysis.
Obviously, the circumstances surrounding the United
transaction neither regularly arise nor occur with such frequency
as to require the substantial alteration of the review process
mergers typically receive. However, the Sky-United merger may
have served to alert the government and the public to special
instances in which such an investigation is appropriate both to
allay public concern and to address potentially dangerous trends
that otherwise may be exacerbated under the current, allegedly

anti-competitive conditions.

See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
157.
See Byers and Sellers, ECONOMIST, March 20, 1999, at 61. Secretary
158.
Byers described his determination as "the loneliest decision I have ever made."
Alderson et. al., supra note 31.
See supra Part III.C.
159.
160.
Secretary Byers recently suggested the replacement of the public
interest test with a new set of criteria based on competition and the consumer as
well as on economic efficiency. See Gow, supra note 99. Competition would be
considered in a European or even global context. See id.
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The MMC's investigation, therefore, may have a much more
enduring effect than merely its recommended prohibition of the
merger between Sky and United. The same day that Secretary of
State Byers announced his agreement with the MMC
recommendation, "[t]he Department of Trade and Industry also
ordered a review of the nation's merger laws to ensure that
takeovers of British football teams could automatically be
examined by antitrust authorities in the future." 16 1 As an initial
step towards this goal, the Department of Trade and Industry
called for an extended antitrust review of the proposed purchase
of Newcastle United (Newcastle) by the New York-based NTL, Inc.
(NTL), Great Britain's third largest cable company. 162
Thus, as a result of these recent developments, while the new
Competition Commission might not have otherwise been referred
additional football-media mergers due to the recent changes to

See Britain Blocks BSkyB Effort to Take Over Soccer Team, supra note
161.
35. As part of a consultation document released the first week of August, 1999,
Secretary Byers suggested two major reforms: (1) lowering the £ 70 million
combined asset value threshold on referring mergers to the Competition
Commission and (2) removing ministers from policing most bids. See As the
Government Moves to Shake up Mergers Referral Policy by Cutting the Asset
Threshold and ChangingMinisterial Roles on Bids, the Forum Asks if the Changes
Mean Rich Pickings or More Red Tape, LAWYER, Aug. 9, 1999, at 12. However, such
a change in the threshold has been criticized as more harmful than beneficial, in
that many more mergers will be referred to the Commission. See id. A "turnover"
test has been suggested as more useful and accurate, especially if the goal is to
ensure review of mergers in particular sectors such as media and football clubs.
See id. Additionally, it has been argued that a lowering of the asset threshold, is
not necessary, in that a second test exists for company dominance which

automatically refers to the Commission mergers that would result in a market
share of more than twenty-five percent (25%). See id.
Britain Blocks BSkyB Effort to Take Over Soccer Team, supra note 35.
162.
Prior to the MMC's recommendation, Newcastle had maintained that its proposed
takeover by NTL was factually distinguishable from the Sky-United transaction.
See Justin Strong, Confusion Over United Buyout-US Firm's Takeover Plan
Referred to Competition Commission, JOURNAL (Newcastle), Apr. 10, 1999, at 1.
Both NTL and Newcastle emphasized that neither was as dominant or powerful in
its respective industry as was Sky or United. See id.
Yet, once the United deal was blocked and the Newcastle merger was referred
to the Competition Commission, NTL determined that the MMC's general
comments about the merger of broadcaster and football clubs would lead the
Competition Commission to prohibit its bid as well (even though NTL had no
See Keith Weir, Cable Company NTL Pulls Out of
Premier League rights).
Newcastle Deal (visited Aug. 11, 1999) <www.soccernet.com/english/nutc/
newsl2.htm> (website no longer accessible, document available on file with
However, in light of the continuing uncertainty surrounding the
author).
precedential effect of the Sky-United ruling, NTL has considered reviving its bid.
See Media Moguls Left Waiting in the Wings, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 6, 1999, at
11.
Other broadcasters who at least temporarily put on hold their attempts to
acquire football clubs include Granada, who acquired a 9.9% stake in Liverpool
and Carlton Communications, which sought to become involved with Arsenal. See
id.
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the British antitrust system, the specific integration of sports and
media entities in Great Britain is likely to continue to receive
diligent and thorough antitrust review due to the heightened
awareness of such issues created by the Sky-United investigation.

IV. THE MMC INVESTIGATION

Due to the unusually intense public interest surrounding the
Sky-United deal and the government's desire to make its
proceedings more transparent, the MMC took unprecedented
action in making public the Sky-United issues letter, 163 which
detailed the full range of concerns raised by the United
takeover. 164 Though the MMC invariably notifies the entities
involved of the specific issues under its consideration, this was
the first time that it had ever made such an issues letter public in
a merger. 165

A. The Issues Letter
Among the broad range of topics covered in the issues letter
were:
(1) the impact Sky and United could have in their
respective markets following the acquisition; (2) the influence Sky
and United might have on key issues such as competition; (3)
whether the transaction could lead to higher prices for supporters
to watch games, either at Old Trafford (United's stadium) or
through Sky television channels; (4) the potential spending on the
players (whether more money would be invested in the team after
the merger, giving United the chance of winning more matches or
whether less would be spent to maximize profits); (5) whether the
merger would give Sky an advantage over other broadcasters in
bidding for rights to televise matches in the Premier League
(where United is arguably the biggest attraction) if the rights were
sold collectively, as at present, or on a club-by-club basis; (6)
whether the combination of United and Sky would have a

163.
See BSkyB/Manchester United Merger Inquiry: MMC Writes to the
Main Parties (visited Dec. 9, 1998) <http://www.worldserver.pipex.com/coi/
depts/6mm/coi9O72e.ok> (website no longer accessible, copy of document on file
with author). "It is normal practice, following preliminary investigation in any
inquiry for the MMC to send an 'issues letter' to the main parties involved in an
investigation." Id. The Sky-United issues letter was made public "to inform other
parties interested in making submissions to enable them to tell the MMC if they
think any important points have been missed." Id.
164.
See id.
165.
See Mark Milner, The MMC Plays an Open Game over Man U Takeover,
FOOTBALL.GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 1998 <http://reports.guardian.co.uk/sp-reports/
manutd/ 1708.html> (website no longer accessible, copy of document on file with
author).
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disproportionate influence over the football -authorities in
England; (7) whether Sky would use its position to block the
access of newspapers and other television companies to the club's
would speed up the
star players; and (8) whether the merger
16
development of pay-per-view television. 6
B.

The Report on the ProposedMerger

In recommending that the takeover of United by Sky should
not go forward, the MMC's report focused predominantly on the
advantage the merger would give Sky over other broadcasters in
bidding for rights to televise matches in the Premier League. In
addressing this issue, the MMC first discussed the economic
status and market power possessed by the two entities in their
67
relevant markets. 1
The Commission described Sky as a vertically integrated
broadcaster that: (1) purchases television rights, including those
for sporting events, (2) makes some of its own programs, (3)
packages a range of programs into various channels, (4)
distributes and retails these channels to its subscribers using its
direct-to-home satellite platform, and (5) sells them wholesale to
68
United
other retailers using different distribution platforms.'
was found by the MMC to be the "strongest English football club,"
the football-related activities of which include the supply of the
169
television rights to its matches.

166. The issues letter, detailed briefly in this Note, was previously made
available in its entirety at the MMC website: <http://www.worldserver.pipex.com/
coi/depts/6mm/coi9072e.ok> (website no longer accessible, copy of document on
file with author) or may be obtained in writing from David Peel, The Reference
Secretary (BSkyB/Manchester United), Monopolies and Mergers Commission,
Room 503, New Court, 48 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JT.
167. Delineation of the relevant markets in which the entities participate is
essential for a determination of the economic effect their alleged anti-competitive
activities may have. Establishing the scope of the market is also necessary for a
determination of whether such entities possess market power in their respective
markets. See infra note 166.
An evaluation of market power is extremely important to any antitrust
analysis. See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 80, at 597. An assessment that

a firm (or group of firms) possesses such power implies an ability to set prices for,
or otherwise control, the entire market. See id. Market power itself is not illegal,
but a finding of such power heightens the reviewing authority's awareness of the
anti-competitive dangers presented by the entities' activities and the inherent
potential for abuse of that power. See id.
168. See British Sky BroadcastingGroup PLC and Manchester United PLC: A
Report on the Proposed Merger (April 17, 1999) <http://wtvw.mmc.gov.uk/
bskyb.htm>.
169. Id. The MMC also emphasized that the rights to these matches were
currently sold collectively by the Premier League, and the arrangement between
the Premier League and Sky was at that time subject to a Restrictive Practices
Court case brought by the Director General of Fair Trading. See id.
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As to the relevant markets in which United and Sky operate,
the Commission concluded that United's market stretches no
170
further than that of the Premier League matches themselves,
and Sky's broadcasting market was specifically that of sports
premium television channels. 17 1 In the premium sports channel
market, Sky was the only provider of such channels, with the
exception of small, niche offerings. 17 2 Entry into this market was
determined by the MMC to be crucially dependent on the ability of
a channel provider to obtain the appropriate live television sports
rights. 1 73 Accordingly, as the Commission determined that the
amount of rights presently existing were insufficient to sustain
more than a few sports premium channels and as Sky presently
provided three such channels, Sky was found to possess market
power in the sports premium channel market. 17 4
In considering the public interest consequences of the
transaction, the MMC placed its primary emphasis on the effects
on competition among broadcasters for live Premier League
rights.175 Due to the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the
RPC case, however, the MMC considered all possible scenarios in
analyzing the post-RPC competitive impact of a Sky-owned

United. 176
C. The Four ScenariosExplored by the MMC
Of the four scenarios hypothesized by the MMC, the first
involved the continuation of the existing collective arrangements
for broadcasting the Premier League matches and contemplated
no additional mergers between broadcasters and Premier League
clubs. 17 7 Under this first scenario, the MMC found that Sky, as a

170.
See id.
171.
See id.
172.
See id. Assessment of the ease or difficulty of market entry is very
important to antitrust review. See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 80, at 66974. Entry analysis often provides indication of the whether questionable practices
by one or several entities within an industry may adversely impact competition
within that industry. See id. As the surest way to reduce or eliminate competition

is to prevent others from competing, barriers to entering the market are often
maintained by businesses seeking to preserve the current anticompetitive status
quo. See id. Additionally, if the market contains only a few competitors, each
individual competitor's actions will substantially impact all others in that market.
See id.
173.
See British Sky BroadcastingPLC and Manchester United PLC: A Report
on the ProposedMerger, supranote 168.
174.
See id.; see also supranote 167 (discussing the importance of a finding
of market power).
175.
See British Sky BroadcastingGroup PLC and Manchester United PLC: A
Report on the Proposed Merger,supranote 168.
176.
See id.
177.
See id.
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result of its takeover of United, would acquire influence over and
information about the Premier League's negotiations and
agreements that would not be available to its competitors.' 78 Sky
would also have benefited through its incumbent ownership stake
in the Premier League rights, providing a further advantage in the
bidding process.' 7 9 As a result, Sky's ability to secure future
Premier League broadcasting rights would be augmented
significantly. The MMC voiced additional concern that Sky's
improved position would exacerbate competition problems
because Sky's competitors, wary of Sky's inherent advantage,
would likely bid much more cautiously for Premiership rights or
perhaps not bid at all. 18 °
Ultimately, under this first scenario, the MMC found that by
acquiring United, Sky would dramatically enhance its already
strong position arising from both its market power as a sports
premium channel provider and from its status as the current
broadcaster of Premier League matches. 81 ' Thus, the effect of
such a merger would be to reduce competition for Premier League
rights, leading to less choice for the League and also less scope
82
for innovation in the broadcasting of Premier League football.1
The second scenario contemplated by the Commission was
one in which the live broadcasting rights to Premier League clubs'
matches were required to be negotiated and sold on an individual
basis and no further broadcasting/club mergers occurred. Here,
Sky would have a similarly substantial advantage over other
broadcasters
competing
for
those
rights.' 8 3 Adverse
consequences similar to those discussed under the first scenario
84
would eventuate.3
The third scenario considered by the MMC involved the
continuance of existing selling arrangements continued and the
inducement by the Sky-United merger of a subsequent merger
between another broadcaster and club. The MMC found that the
anti-competitive effects here would again be quite similar to those
present in the first scenario.' 85 If several mergers were to occur
under the existing collective rights offering, the MMC determined
that such collective selling could only continue if broadcasters
agreed to share the rights, creating at least as disruptive an
impact on competition as in the initial scenario.' 8 6

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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The final scenario evaluated by the MMC involved a situation
in which broadcasting rights were required to be sold on an
individualized basis by the various clubs and the Sky-United
merger precipitated several other broadcaster/club integrations.
The MMC determined that all of the feasible outcomes would be
less competitive than if rights were individually sold and no such
18 7
broadcaster/club mergers were entered into.
Thus, in each of these above described scenarios, the MMC
concluded that Sky's acquisition of United would enhance Sky's
ability to secure Premier League rights in the future.' 8 8 It
followed from this analysis, according to the Commission, that
such an enhanced ability would further restrict entry to the
sports premium channel market by new channel providers, thus
causing the prices of Sky's sports channels to be higher and
choice and innovation to decrease. 18 9 Reduced entry by other
premium sports channel providers would also ultimately result in
reduced competition in the wider pay television market. 190
While focusing predominantly on the effects of the SkyUnited transaction on competition among broadcasters, the
Commission also based its public interest conclusions on the
adverse effects it predicted the transaction would have on the
sport of football in general. 19 1 First, it was apparent to the MMC
that the takeover would reinforce the existing trend towards
greater inequality of wealth between clubs, thus weakening the
smaller ones. 192 Second, the acquisition of United was found by
the MMC to give Sky additional influence over Premier League
decisions relating to the organization of football, leading to some
decisions which might not reflect the long-term interests of the
sport. 193 On both of these counts, the merger of United and Sky
19 4
could be expected to damage the quality of English football.
This adverse effect clearly would become further pronounced if
the merger precipitated other mergers between broadcasters and
Premiership clubs.

187.
See id.
188.
See id.
189.
See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192.
See id. See Larsen, supra note 39 (discussing the growing schism
between the professional sports "haves" and "have-nots").
193.
See British Sky BroadcastingGroup PLC and Manchester United PLC: A
Report on the ProposedMerger, supranote 168.
194.
See id.
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D. Conclusions of the MMC
As the MMC was unable to identify any public interest
benefits from the proposed merger and in light of the numerous
and detrimental attributes of the transaction discussed above, the
MMC concluded that the proposed merger between British Sky

Broadcasting and Manchester United could be expected to
195

operate against the public interest.
Additionally, the MMC determined that such a merger should
be prohibited outright.19 6 Although the Commission considered
whether the adverse effects of the transaction could be mitigated
or remedied through undertakings by Sky and United, 197 it found
none it regarded as effective. 19 8 As a result, the MMC
recommended prohibiting the merger as both an appropriate and
proportionate remedy. The Secretary of State accepted the MMC's
findings and made the final decision to block the Sky-United
takeover.
The British government's decision to stop Sky's takeover of
United and the Secretary's subsequent decision to refer the NTLNewcastle proposed merger to the new Competition Commission
made it clear that Great Britain does not wish to follow the
Continental example of permitting the ownership of football clubs
by media groups. 1 9 9 However, as the European Union continues
to solidify, some uniform determination must eventually be
reached as to the best framework for the continued development
of both the sports and broadcasting industries. Although Great
Britain was the first nation to officially evaluate the anticompetitive dangers of the vertical integration of sports and
broadcasting entities, an examination of other nation's views and
experiences may provide greater insight into the eventual and
proper resolution of this issue.

195.

See id.

196.
See id.
197.
See Vivek Chaudhary, Takeover Promises 'Stretched Credibility',
GUARDIAN (London), July 9, 1999, at 31 (discussing the difficulties with

undertakings in the Sky-United scenario); see also discussion infra note 257.
198. See U.K. Government Blocks BSkyB Takeover of Manchester United, AFX
NEWS (London), Apr. 9, 1999; see also infra note 257 (examining additional means
of limiting the anti-competitive effects of the transaction).
199.
See infra Part V.B.3. (noting several Continental instances of media
ownership of professional football clubs).
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V. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PRECEDENT

Although Great Britain's antitrust authorities identified
substantial anti-competitive problems with the integration of
sports and media in England, continued integration still lurks on
the global horizon.
Thus, the MMC's review of the United
takeover was perhaps the one chance to evaluate the implications
of such consolidated ownership before the sporting world plunges

headlong into it. During intranationalantitrust analysis of such
transactions, domestic concerns are typically the predominant
factors in determining the proper outcome, but the international
implications of permitting the integration of sports and media
must also be explored as well. 20 0 It is only through such a
transnational analysis that the MMC's decision can be placed in
proper perspective and its reasoning and precedential weight
evaluated.
Perhaps the best means of undertaking such an analysis is to
study the reaction of those nations that have already faced and
attempted to resolve the sports/media dilemma. 2 0 ' The foreign
precedent on this subject, while obviously not binding on the
MMC's decision, 20 2 definitely affects the ultimate precedential
weight to be attached to the Commission's recommendation to
prohibit the United takeover. Further, in the event subsequent
transactions are found less opprobrious to competition, such
precedent may also provide examples of how the equities in such
cases may be balanced to preserve free and fair competition.2 0 3

200. While the effect Sky's acquisition of United on Great Britain and its
economy is the primary focus of the MMC investigation, the novelty of this issue
has inspired many commentators to cite other nations' seeming acceptance of this
type of vertical integration as strong indication that the United takeover would be
allowed in Britain. See Gledhill, supranote 37.
201.
Many European countries share a similar factual context within which

their local sports and media interests exist. See infra Part V.B. (discussing France
and Italy). The rapid development of information and communication technology
throughout Western Europe and the strong historical and economic base of sports
fans make comparisons especially useful. Further, with the ever increasing
movement towards European integration, the workability of any decision on the
Continent as well as in Great Britain is the key to the strength of the MMC's
determination as international precedent. See infra Part V.B.3.
202. The actual MMC investigation is limited to domestic factors and
concerns, leaving true international issues to the EC in larger and more expansive
corporate transactions. See Monopolies and Mergers Commission, supra note 85
(setting out responsibilities of the MMC).
203. Although the economies of the various European nations remain
somewhat diverse, there are clear parallels that may allow one country's solution
to serve as a model for others.
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A. U.S. Antitrust Conflicts and Controversies
The profound presence of professional sports in America is
unparalleled worldwide, and the sheer size and scope of the
American sports industry has virtually mandated that broadcast
rights be dispersed among rival entities. 20 4 Because of this
dispersal of rights among American broadcasters and also
because of the passion and allegiance that has surrounded the

sport of football in England for over a century, the English
experience cannot truly be replicated in the United States, where
20 5
multiple sports enjoy the public's attention and enthusiasm.
As a result, there is not the same potential in the United States as
the
in Great Britain for one broadcasting company to dominate
20 6
sport.
popular
most
single,
a
to
rights
television
market for
Further curtailing the opportunity for Murdoch-like
dominance in American sports is a specific statutory enactment,
the Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA).2 0 7 The U.S. Congress chose
to enact this legislation in an effort to statutorily prescribe the
manner of negotiating and selling the broadcast rights to
professional sports events. 20 8 The SBA creates a limited antitrust
exemption for league-wide (collective) broadcasting arrangements
and, until recently, maintained the age-old antitrust exemption
granted specifically to the sport of baseball. 20 9 However, as
evidenced by Murdoch's successful expansion into American

With the amount of money expended to obtain rights to broadcast
204.
coverage of the four major sports leagues, it is unlikely that, even if permitted by
U.S. antitrust law, a single media corporation could acquire the rights to an entire
schedule of games in a single sport. See generally Cagan & deMause, supra note
42 (discussing current values of broadcasting rights as split among various media
conglomerates).
205.
Unlike England and most of Europe, where football is king, the U.S.
sports fan's attention is divided among baseball, American football, basketball,
hockey, golf, tennis, and numerous other sports.
For example, in the United States, NFL games are telecast on both CBS
206.
and FOX on Sunday afternoons, ESPN on Sunday nights, and ABC on Monday
nights. Broadcasting arrangements such as these may be due in part to the
Sports Broadcasting Act, see infra note 207.
207.
Sports Broadcasting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (1994). The Sports
Broadcasting Act consists of two separate provisions, the first enacted in 1961
The original provision exempts certain
See id.
and the second in 1966.
agreements among professional football, baseball, basketball, and hockey teams to
pool their sponsored TV broadcast rights for sale as a package. See id. The
second provision specifically permitted the merger of the two American football
leagues, the NFL and the American Football League (AFL). See id.
This established American legislative doctrine is in sharp contrast to the
recent uncertainty created by the RPC proceeding questioning Sky's league wide
arrangement.
See S. REP. No. 87-1087 (1961), reprintedin 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3042.
208.
209. The baseball exemption was recently overturned statutorily by the Curt
Flood Act of 1998. See 15 U.S.C. § 27(a) (1999).
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sports and by his competitors' attempts to counter his advances,
the anti-competitive dangers suggested by the United takeover
may foreshadow similar problems in American professional sports
2 10
as well.
Several administrative and judicial decisions exemplify the
treatment of the sports broadcasting industry in the United
States. While no decision truly addresses the specific concerns
raised in the MMC's investigation in Great Britain, several of
these disputes are relevant in examining the potential for abuse
that may occur with increasing levels of technology and media
ownership.
1. Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club
One dispute that illustrates the tenuous statutory hold on
broadcasting deals in the United States is a recent antitrust class
action brought against the Dallas Cowboys and the National
Football League (NFL) alleging that those organizations conspired
to fix the price of private satellite transmissions of Sunday
afternoon Season Ticket telecasts. 2 1 1 In 1995, the NFL had
offered telecasts of regular season NFL games shown by NBC and
Fox to residential and commercial satellite dish owners. 2 12 The
class action plaintiffs alleged that the NFL teams agreed to: (1) fix
the prices at which they would sell their broadcast rights through
the satellite service and (2) restrict the output of the broadcasts of

210.
Murdoch's Fox SportsNet has become the dominant force in local
baseball broadcasting in the United States. See Araton, supra note 4, at 70.
However, concerns regarding the potential for this type of behavior to dominate
broadcasting of a single sport are not truly relevant to this Note's discussion.
What may pose greater concern is the threat of dominance by either Fox or
ABC/ESPN when the (most profitable) NFL broadcasting rights come up for
renewal. Although currently divided, there remains the potential that one group's
failure to renew will open the door to more control for another. The only obstacles
to such an objective in the NFL is the division of the sport into two conferences
which require simultaneous telecast, and the fact that almost all the games are
broadcast on one day. Further the cost up until now has been prohibitive for one
company's acquisition of league-wide rights. However, in the wake of Murdoch's
willingness to spend billions to guarantee control in England, the stakes
apparently have been raised. A similar plot, by either Murdoch or one of his chief
competitors, could eventually unfold in America as well. With all the major media
entertainment companies presently owning professional teams, anti-competitive
issues similar to the United takeover are clearly possible.
211.
Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 97-CV-5 184, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1998). Season Ticket telecasts
essentially allowed viewers to select which games they desired to watch during the
course of a regular NFL Sunday line-up, rather than rely on only those games
selected for regional coverage. See Shaw, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *2-3.
212.
See id. at "1-2. For the 1996-97 season, the subscription rates for the
"NFL Sunday Ticket" service was $119 per year for residential use ($139 after July
31) and from $399 to $29,999 for commercial establishments. See id. at *2-3.
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their games.2 13 Although the district court noted that Congress
had granted the NFL a broadcast antitrust exemption, television
satellite transmission was not covered under that exemption
because the technology did not exist at the time of the
exemption's enactment. 2 14 In its defense, the NFL maintained
that the SBA specifically provided that the conduct at issue was
2 1S
exempt from the antitrust laws.
The NFL also contended that although plaintiffs alleged that
the League and its member clubs "conspired to fix, raise,
stabilize, and maintain prices," there was no factual support for
the allegation that any individual club played any role whatsoever
2 16
Although
in setting the price for the Season Ticket telecasts.
offerings similar to the Sunday Ticket promotion remain available
today, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Court
recently held that the NFL's exemption from antitrust laws did
2 17
not extend to satellite broadcasts.
The Shaw case illustrates not only the potential for anticompetitive activity under collective broadcasting arrangements
but also the difficulty of addressing the increasing potential for
anti-competitive activity in light of the corresponding increase in
digital and satellite broadcasting technology. These difficulties
were clearly present as well in the Sky/United transaction and
may signal the need for significant statutory revision in this area
2 18
in Great Britain.
2. Prime Ticket Networks v. Mighty Ducks Hockey Club
Several other cases have recently arisen involving anticompetitive practices in the broadcasting of American
professional sports.
A more localized dispute but one that
implicated concerns similar to those explored by the MMC

213.
See id. at *4-5.
214.
See id. at *11.
215.
See id. at *6-7. Under the terms of the Act, the antitrust laws do not
apply to "any agreement . . . by which any league of clubs participating in
professional football... contests, sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the
rights . . . in the sponsored telecasting" of football games.
(1999).

216.

15 U.S.C. § 1291

Shaw, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *13. The argument followed that

because the NFL and not the individual member clubs licensed the telecasts for
re-transmittal via satellite, there was no joint action between the League and its
clubs to support the plaintiff's Section 1 claim under the Sherman Act
(combination or conspiracy creating an unlawful restraint on trade). See id.
217.
See NFL Loses Appeal in Satellite Subscribers' Antitrust Suit, 10
ANDREWS SPORTS & ENT. LIT. REP., Apr. 28, 1999, at 3, available in LEXIS 10 No.
12 ANSPENLR 3.
218.
See infra note 161 (discussing changes made to British competition
policy and procedure in order to recognize the growing concerns in sports/
broadcasting mergers).
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involved a conflict between a subsidiary of Murdoch's Fox
Entertainment Group and the NHL franchise owned by Disney,
one of Fox's principal U.S. rivals. 2 19 Plaintiff Prime Ticket (d/b/a
Fox Sports West (FSW)) contended that Disney sought to prevent
FSW from launching a second cable regional sports networkFSW2-through Disney's counter effort to use the Anaheim
Angels and Mighty Ducks (both owned by Disney) as the
foundation for its own competing regional sports network. 2 20
FSW2 featured the Los Angeles Dodgers, the Ducks, and the
221
NBA's Los Angeles Clippers.
FSW alleged that Disney clearly comprehended the difficulty
of launching its own regional sports network, a difficulty that
would be increased substantially if FSW2 achieved wide
distribution and extended the Ducks' contract. 2 22 FSW thus
claimed that Disney, ESPN, and the Ducks conspired with most
cable operators, including those with the largest subscriber base
in southern California not to carry FSW2 and thus destroy its
viability. 22 3

FSW asserted that Disney possessed tremendous

programming leverage over cable operators because it owned
ABC, ABC affiliates, ESPN, ESPN2, ESPN News, the Disney
Channel and had interests in other networks (A&E, the History
Channel, and Lifetime).2 24 Therefore, Disney was in a position to
pressure, punish, or reward the cable operators for their
compliance or non-compliance with Disney's anti-competitive
gambit.2 25 FSW's suit alleged Sherman Act and Lanham Act
violations, tortious interference with contract, and unfair
competition. The suit was ultimately settled, and FSW2 is now
being carried on most operators' systems in southern
2 26
California.

219.
See Prime Ticket Networks L.P. d/b/a Fox Sports West v. Mighty Ducks
Hockey Club et al., 97-1158 (C.D. Cal. filed February 24, 1997), cited in Kathleen
A. Marron & Agnes E.C. Brandon, Consumer Complaints:An Overview of Antitrust,
PredatoryPricing, Competitive Access, Mergers, Overbuilds, Unfair Competition and
Other Consumer Trade Issues, in Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series, Cable Television Law 1998 Update:
Competition in Video Franchising, Internet and Telephony, available in LEXIS at
535 PLI/Pat 491, 546 (Practicing Law Institute, Oct. 22-23, 1998); see also West
Prime Ticket v. Mighty Ducks, AM. LAW., May 1997, at 76 (giving a preliminary
analysis of the claims and circumstances of the case).
220.
See Prime Ticket Networks, supra note 219. Prior to 1997, the Ducks
and Los Angeles Clippers games were broadcast on FSW. See id. While FSW has
four million cable subscribers, FSW2 has fewer than 500,000. See id.

221.

See id.

222.

See id.

223.
224.
225.
226.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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While the FSW/Disney case did not involve precisely the
same issues as those present in the United dispute, it clearly
illustrates several problems that inevitably arise as a result of
integrated sports and media ownership. 2 27 Further, the alleged
antitrust violations voiced by FSW occurred in a U.S. market that
was already greatly diversified in terms of broadcast rights. The
conflicts and potential anti-competitive practices that arose out of
a media company's ownership of a professional sports team in
such a small, localized incident bear out the more dangerous
ramifications possible in a more condensed market that is subject
as is the case with football
to exclusive broadcast rights,
228
Britain.
Great
in
broadcasting
3. Time Warner/Turner Broadcasting Merger
Perhaps the American corporate transaction with ramifications most factually similar to Murdoch's attempted takeover of
United was the recent Time Warner/Turner Broadcasting merger,
which left several professional sports franchises in the hands of
the multi-media conglomerate. 2 2 9 Following the merger, Time
Warner not only possessed several Atlanta sports franchises but
held at least partial rights to broadcast sports events involving
those franchises and others. 2 30 Unfortunately, the Federal Trade
Commission's inquiry into the merger of the two media giants focused predominantly on the anti-competitive implications for the

not delve deeply into the
broadcasting market in general and did
23
particular area of sports broadcasting.

'

227.
Similar concerns, such as securing future broadcasting rights,
restricting entry of new channel providers, and reducing competition in the cable
market, were raised in the Sky-United transaction discussed supra notes 188-90
and accompanying text.
Similarly, even if Murdoch's plan to implement a pay-per-view system
228.
solely for United's matches limits the ability of Sky to dominate the entire market
for football broadcasting, there remains the possibility that News Corp. may utilize
its international clout to damage its competitors.
229.
"In October 1996, Time Warner shareholders ratified the acquisition of
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. for $7.5 billion in stock, creating the world's
largest media empire. The combined company will generate more annual sales$18.7 billion last year-than the Disney-Capital Cities combination." Conrad,
supranote 9, at 679-80.
230.
"The assets include the following: HBO, Turner's Cable News Network
(CNN), WTBS, Turner Network Television (TNT), and The Cartoon Network, a
three professional sports teams (the Atlanta Braves,
library of classic films ....
the Atlanta Hawks, and . . . the Atlanta Thrashers), magazines (including People,
Time, and Sports Illustrated), Warner Brothers motion picture studios, and
Warner Music." Id. at 680.
Perhaps the issue of media ownership of
231.
See supra Part V.A.3.
professional athletics teams was not as clearly pronounced in a merger of two
giant media entities (Time Warner and Turner) as it was when one such entity
sought to directly purchase a world renowned team individually (Sky and United).
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As noted above, it is unlikely that a situation such as
Murdoch's could arise in the United States, due to both the
intense scrutiny of United States' antitrust law and the fierce
competition between rival media enterprises, including Murdoch's
Fox Network, for non-exclusive broadcast rights to the various
professional sports leagues. 2 32 Thus, the ability of a media
conglomerate in the United States to gain market power in the
broadcasting of one sport while simultaneously possessing the
most successful club within that sport's league is highly
improbable.
Yet, as illustrated throughout this Part, the
continued absence of such an opportunity has not immunized the
broadcast of American sports from other abuses of market power
and sports
by a powerful entity that synergizes media carriage
2 33
content, such as Fox, Time Warner, or Disney.
What may truly differentiate Murdoch's potential dominance
of the sports broadcasting industry in England from similar
situations in the United States are the international ramifications
of such dominance. While U.S. sports do not typically enjoy a
worldwide fan base, soccer, calcio, voetbal, futbol, or however else
football is known, is truly the world's game, crossing the borders
of nations, continents, races, and economies. 2 3 4 As a result, the
potential for abuse by one ascending to a position of power in
football broadcasting is tremendous, especially in light of the

current and ever increasing technological capability to broadcast
live pay-per-view satellite coverage of sporting events across the
globe. However, while the danger of such power appears
overwhelming in the Murdoch scenario, other nations in Europe
have not typically shared Great Britains concern of the potential
for dominance created by the nexus of sports and media
2 35
ownership.

232.
See supra Part V.A. Many U.S. antitrust conflicts are initiated in
adversarial proceedings, which offer different advantages and disadvantages from
a government instituted investigation.
233.
One television executive said, "It's a bigger empire than Disney. You
wonder why the media moguls don't start taking over Third World countries." See
Conrad, supra note 9, at 680.
234.
The low cost of equipment and the cultural attachments to the game
that have developed over the past 150 years have created somewhat of an
international obsession with the sport. See Matthew Doman, Fox Sports Unveils
New Look, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 12, 1999, at 16; see also Robert J. Saiget, 100
Million Chinese Expected to Watch World Cup Match, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, July
9, 1999, (International News). The World Cup, played every four years in different
venues around the globe, most recently in France in 1998, is the most watched
sporting event worldwide. See Sunday Morning: Celebrating with the French (CBS
television broadcast, July 19, 1998).
See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
235.
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B. EuropeanAntitrust Conflicts and Controversies
The European backdrop is useful both in analyzing the harm

to the broadcasting and football markets that Sky's ownership of
United might have caused and in providing insight into
governmental means that might successfully mitigate this
perceived danger in the future. Additionally, the rise of media
ownership in other world-renowned European football clubs
remains important in that it reflects the competitive environment
with which Murdoch's enterprise, other British broadcasters, and
all British football clubs must contend following Sky's
unsuccessful bid to acquire United.
1. The Television Broadcasting Market in Europe
Due in part to EC law and in part to technological
development, television services have rapidly expanded
throughout Europe during the past twenty years. 23 6 The dramatic
rise in the number of television channels resulting from
digitalization, conditional access, and pay-television technology
has tremendously increased the amount of money invested and
earned throughout the industry. This has directly led to a
heightened competition for advertising. 23 7 Many of the media
enterprises born of this revolution, and currently generating
tremendous advertising revenues, offer television channels
devoted solely to sports coverage. 238 As a result of this recent
technological revolution, anti-competitive practices in the
broadcasting industry are becoming more common and are
23 9
coming under increasingly intense scrutiny.
Although this recent growth has occurred throughout the
European Community, regulation of media in Europe has
remained largely national. 2 40 However, within each nation,
legislation has typically been broad, with a wide variety of
enactments (1) to maintain State or regional public monopolies,
(2) to ensure diversity of ownership and control, (3) to ensure
political impartiality and local content, (4) to limit cross-media
ownership, and (5) to oblige publicly-owned broadcasters to

236.
See John Temple Lang, Media, Multimedia, and European Community
Antitrust Law, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1296, 1298 (1998).
237.
See id.
238.
See id.
239.
See id.
240.
See Lang, supra note 236, at 1297. "There is no European equivalent
of the United States' Federal Communications Commission (FCC)." Id.
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obtain a minimum proportion of their programs from sources
241
outside the broadcasting corporation itself.
Despite this copious history of legislation, it is only recently
that broadcasting has been truly recognized as a business in
242
Europe, as it has long been viewed in the United States.

European television has traditionally been considered more of a
service-oriented means of communication and entertainment
than an actual business industry.2 4 3 This perspective, however, is
clearly changing, as Europe has become more unified in its
approach to competition and as European cable television
providers have become more advanced in conditional access
technology, which is essential for offering pay-television and payper-view systems and for competing in both the national and
44
international markets. 2
2. European Commission and British Decisions and Policy

in

Within this developing context, Sky itself has been involved
both EC and British decisions regarding anti-competitive

broadcasting arrangements. In the EC context, the ScreensportEBU decision 2 45 analyzed the Eurosport 2 4 6 joint venture among
Sky, News International, and a consortium of broadcasters that
were members of the European Broadcasting Union. 2 4 7 While
such a venture would have provided much greater access to
sports programs for the members of Eurosport, other commercial
sports channels would have received much less favorable

241.
See id.
242.
See id. at 1299.
Economically modem media includes content,
carriage, and software, but those companies involved in the media industry are no
longer clearly divisible into any one of these three categories.
See id. The
convergence of these categories itself leads to anti-competitive problems when a
company that is dominant in one area makes use of or extends its dominance into

the other area, especially through joint ventures with those that dominate a
separate category. See id. This is exactly what is occurring in Sky's attempt to
purchase United-it is carriage purchasing its own ongoing content!
243.
See id.
244.
See id. at 1297-98. However, as media has become more recognized as
a type of business or industry in Europe, it has become increasingly difficult to
define product markets by program content because of the dramatic increase in
the number of specialized channels, due mainly to cable and digitalization. See id.
at 1314-15. The result of this technological development is that narrower markets
are created, especially for content providers and organizers of professional
sporting events who generate the content for sports channels. See id. at 1315.
245.
See Commission Decision No. 93/403/EEC, O.J.L. 179/23 (1993); see
also Lang, supra note 236, at 1316.
246.
Eurosport was the name of the joint venture among these entities to
provide satellite coverage of a wide range of European sporting events across the
Continent. See Commission Decision, supranote 245.
247.
See id.
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The request for authorization of the joint
arrangements. 2 48
venture was ultimately denied, as the European Commission
found that Eurosport would have strengthened the negotiating
position of its members but distorted competition in cable
television in favor of Sky. 2 49 This negative impact on competition
clearly necessitated denial of authorization, as the adverse
repercussions substantially outweighed the benefit of a new
25 0
transnational sports channel.
In a subsequent domestic controversy, an investigation by
Great Britain's OFT found that Sky had created significant
barriers to entry in the British markets for wholesale pay
television, specifically in the markets for premium sports and
movie channels. 25 1 In order to enter these markets, an aspiring
competitor must have had in its arsenal: (1) quality programming
rights, (2) transponder space on a satellite capable of reaching
installed disk or aerial base, (3) encryption technology compatible
2 52
with that base, and (4) a subscriber management system.
These were regarded by the OFT in its investigation as barriers to
entry to the premium sports and movie channel market. 25 3 In
such a marketplace, a broadcaster could enter the market with a
basic channel on a cable-exclusive basis, but the investment
needed to acquire all the rights necessary for a viable premium
channel was so large that access to the installed aerial base of
U.K. subscribers to pay-television was essential. 25 4 The limited
supply of suitable analogue transponders was therefore found to
255
be a serious barrier to entry.
Although Sky is apparently no stranger to anti-competitive
inquiries, this legal history was in no way determinative of the
recent action taken to acquire United. Not only were Sky's prior
anti-competitive entanglements irrelevant, but the MMC's
decision on the United deal centered solely on the specific facts
and circumstances present in that transaction and not on any EC
or OFT precedent. 2 56 However, these prior instances of conduct
did indicate Murdoch's unwillingness to compete on a level

248.

See Lang, supranote 236, at 1362.

249.
250.

See id.
See id.

The anti-competitive effects were out of proportion to the

benefit from setting up a transnational commercial satellite television channel
dedicated to sports. See id. Moreover, Sky had already announced that
regardless of the outcome it would broadcast sports extensively. See id.
251.
See id. at 1319.
252.

See id.

253.

See id.

254.

See id.

255.
See id.
See supra Part IV.A. (indicating that all the issues analyzed by the
256.
MMC were domestic concerns).
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playing field and the lengths to which he had gone to gain any
advantage, whether competitive or anti-competitive.
While this past propensity on the part of Sky's majority
shareholder did not exist as a legal factor for consideration, it
may have served to inform the MMC's practical choice to
recommend the outright prohibition of the merger.
If the
Commission had decided to let the deal go forward, the MMC
would have been faced with the choice of subjecting the
transaction to certain conditions or accepting undertakings by
Sky and United not to engage in certain conduct, neither of which
the Commission found to be a viable nor realistic alternative. 25 7
Yet, although these EC and British conflicts involving Sky clearly
raised anti-competitive
concerns, the potential state of
competition predicted to follow the United deal has been the

subject of considerable controversy, especially in light of other
European countries' apparently more permissive views in this
area.
3. Continental Decisions and Policy
Throughout the European Continent, similar incidents
involving sports broadcasting arrangements and media ownership
of athletic teams have arisen. Apparently, however, the harmful
effects perceived to result from such arrangements are considered
much less severe on the Continent than in Great Britain. 25 8

257.
See Vivek Chaudhary, Takeover Promises 'Stretched Credibility,'
GUARDIAN (London), July 9, 1999, at 31. Nicholas Finney, a member of the panel
that investigated the Sky-United transaction who retired from the MIMC several
weeks after the Commission's recommendation was announced, reiterated the
questionable workability of undertakings and concessions. See id. Finney stated,
"[w]e didn't believe the undertakings, given the history of the league and football.
They would not have been workable. It was stretching credibility to expect parties
of this nature to adhere to them and completely abstain (from television
negotiations). Probably it would have worked with a nod and wink; it might not
have breached the undertakings but circumvented them." Id.
Secretary Byers' statements also reflected this concern: "[N]o undertaking
along these lines could ever prevent informal flows of information, nor would it
prevent Manchester United from influencing the rights negotiations in advance of
the formal negotiations." U.K. Government Blocks BSkyB Takeover of Manchester
United, supra note 26.
Sky and United had suggested a number of undertakings midway through the

MMC investigation. See Chaudhary, supra. United had promised not to take part
in any future negotiations, receive no information on potential bidders, and
abstain on any vote taken on the issue. See id. Finney commented, "[w]e looked
at the record of all the parties involved. Without criticising them we concluded
that there was no realistic remedies we could find that would make them stick to
the undertakings. It was not about being anti-Murdoch, it was more to do with
the environment BSkyB was operating in." Id.
258. Many British commentators questioned the controversy in Great
Britain in light of the lack of it in similar instances abroad, suggesting that the
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While collective broadcasting deals have been and continue to be
investigated, 2 59 powerful media conglomerates in both France
and Italy have long possessed significant ownership interests in
26 0
professional athletic teams.
Focusing first on the sports broadcasting industry in general,
several cases brought before the French antitrust authority, Le
Conseil de la Concurrence (Consei),26 1 have raised competition
issues involving the acquisition, sale, or sublicensing of
broadcasting rights for sporting events. In France and generally
throughout Europe, competition authorities have recognized that
the ability to broadcast sports events, especially football, is
essential to the success of general purpose commercial television
stations. This is due in large part to the consistently large
audiences such sporting events attract and also to the
tremendous advertising revenues that inevitably follow. 2 62
However, under French law and policy, three characteristics
of the broadcasting rights to sporting events have been perceived
as especially vulnerable to anti-competitive activity. 2 63 First, the
majority of broadcasting rights in France are acquired exclusively;
second, most often these rights are collectively sold by leagues or
federations for a certain number of games; and finally, the rights
2 64
are usually bought jointly by a pool of television stations.
Although the Conseil has considered competition problems
relating to these arrangements, it has demonstrated an attitude of
relative restraint in imposing restrictions on vertical integration of
the broadcasters and the owners of broadcasting rights (often

MMC should

implicitly acknowledge this lack of precedent as an indication that

no anti-competitive repercussions will ensue from the takeover of a football club
by a broadcasting entity. See infra notes 267 and 272 and accompanying text
(discussing criticism of the MMC's decision as contrary to the clear continental
acquiescence to this end).
259. The practice whereby broadcasting rights to sports events are centrally
marketed or sold in exclusive bundled form by a league or association has been
challenged by competition authorities in the Netherlands and Germany. See
Analysis: Regulating Sport of Europe's TV Channels, supra note 135.
See Came et al., supra note 4. These broadcasters, however, do not
260.
possess the worldwide status and financial support unique to Sky and News Corp.
261.
The Conseil is entrusted with the responsibility of investigating and
adjudicating cases involving business practices which have the goal or effect of
restraining competition. See Frederic Jenny, Media Under French CompetitionLaw,
21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 679, 696 (1998).
See id.
262.
263.

See id.

264.
See id. The situation becormes even more complex and troublesome
when the telecasts of international sports events are involved and international
treaties and jurisdictional issues come into question. See id. at 696-97.
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separate entities in France).265 As a result of this attitude, rarely

26 6
has the exclusivity of broadcasting rights been challenged.
While collective broadcasting arrangements have been

thoroughly
relationship

investigated
in
France,
other aspects
of the
of these two industries that have not been yet

addressed by the Conseil leave French national policy in these

26 7
areas much less clear.
Typically, the controversy in France has focused on the
collective behavior of members of pools acquiring broadcasting
rights or on the collective behavior of the owners in selling or
refusing to sell them. 2 68 The issue in most of these cases has

265.
See id. at 697.
266.
See id. The Conseil and the Paris Court of Appeals generally tend to
take a more lenient attitude towards vertical restrictions than does the European
Commission. See id.
267.
See id. at 698. One of the issues the Conseil has yet to consider is
whether a media firm's acquisition of exclusive rights for a large number of sports
events or its refusal to sublicense such a catalogue to competitors would in itself
fall within the ambit of the Ordinance, the guiding principle of French competition
law. See id. at 699. In a case involving a similar issue relating to French films,
the Minister of Economic Affairs and the Minister of Culture, who together are
responsible for the ultimate determination on media mergers in France, have
allowed the purchase by the only pay-television operator of a firm owning the
broadcast rights. See id. The subsequent alleged refusal of this pay-television
operator to sublicense its broadcast rights to a pay-per-view television operator,
however, has been challenged in front of the Conseil as an abuse of its dominant
position. See id.
Additionally, the question of whether joint sales of broadcasting rights in
athletic events constitutes a violation of French competition law remains open to
debate. See id. In some European jurisdictions, such joint sales agreements are
considered to be contrary to competition law. See id.
While such joint agreements may restrict competition among sports teams in
the broadcasting market; the question remains, in a country like France (where
anti-competitive practices that have efficiency enhancing properties can benefit
from an exemption), whether the joint sales of broadcasting rights may qualify for
such an exemption. See id. It is likely that joint sales of rights would allow a
smaller team to raise more money than it could if it had to sell its rights solely by
its own efforts. See id. at 699-700. Some have argued that this is a distributional
effect that should not be taken into consideration by competition authorities. See
id. at 700, Others believe that the fact that smaller teams may raise more money
through joint sales of their rights than without such joint sales agreements cannot
be reduced to a distributional issue. See id.
Substantial financial support is clearly necessary to allow teams to perform
better, essentially by hiring better players. See id. Thus, a practice that allows
smaller teams better access to more resources than they would otherwise have
makes such teams better able to compete with others with greater means and
results in more interesting games because teams are more balanced. See id. In
other words, the joint sale of rights to a sports event by a federation of teams, to
the extent that its allows smaller teams to increase the quality of their teams,
changes the quality of the competition among the teams concerned and increases
benefits to spectators. See id. Thus, the collective sale results in efficiency value.
See id. Similar arguments were advanced in support of Sky's exclusive agreement
to broadcast Premier League matches in the RPC.
268.
See id.
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been whether the established television stations with the largest
audiences have engaged in concerted actions with broadcasting
rights owners, using their combined market power to prevent new
commercial television stations from gaining access on fair and
non-discriminatory terms to broadcast rights for sports events
and competing with the established stations. The Conseil has
examined the operation of these purchasing pools of TV broadcast
2 69
rights in several decisions.
While most of the issues considered by the Conseil in these
recent disputes have more bearing on the RPC case against the
Premiership, some similar issues were raised in the United
transaction. 2 70
Further, the dangers posed by monopolistic
abuse of market power are identical, regardless of whether such
anti-competitive practices are committed by several competitors
uniting or by one entity possessing market power on its own.
As to the specific integration of broadcasters and professional
sports teams, however, the French government's implicit
acceptance of pay-television channel Canal Plus's ownership of
the French first division club Paris St. Germaine 27 1 indicates that
France's view may be more open to the vertical integration of such
entities.
The apparent acceptance of these vertical arrangements is
not limited to France. In fact, just a few days prior to the British
government's announcement of the prohibition of the Sky
takeover, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne,
Switzerland, a quasi-judicial body, concluded that it had no
power to prevent television companies from taking over sport on
the Continent. 2 7 2 Additionally, two of the most famous and
successful football clubs in Europe are also currently owned by
large media enterprises. Silvio Berlusconi, media magnate and

269.
See id. These decisions resulted from complaints by a television
station, La Cinq S.A., that it had experienced difficulties in obtaining broadcast
rights for major sports or entertainment events due to anti-competitive practices
by the French Football Federation (FFF) and by an association of formerly public
television and radio stations, the Office de Radiodiffusion et de Television

Francaise. See id. at 700-01. La Cinq was the first privately owned free terrestrial
television station to obtain a state license when the state broadcasting monopoly
was abolished in the early 1980s. See id. at 701 n.30.
270.
See supra notes 38-41, and 73-77 and accompanying text. See infra
notes 278-84. The outcomes of OFT case and the MMC's investigation are closely
tied.
271.
See Came et al., supra note 4. Murdoch, in fact, recently entered into
merger negotiations with Canal Plus.
272.
See Rob Hughes, Fans May Have Scored an Own Goal, TIMES (London),
Apr. 10, 1999, (Home News). The CAS attempts to spare sport the cost of
international disputes. See id. The CAS is also expected to rule on whether the
ban imposed by the UEFA, football's European governing body, on clubs with
common ownership playing in the same European competition is fair. See Media
Moguls Left Waiting in the Wings, supra note 162.
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former Prime Minister of Italy, owns Media Set and A.C. Milan,
the top Italian club throughout the 1980s. 2 7 3 Dutch power and
recent World Club Champion Ajax Amsterdam is owned by the
Philips Electronic conglomerate. 27 4 Accordingly, the nexus of
ownership between media entities and athletic teams appears to
be somewhat of a norm throughout Europe, thus raising the
question as to why any controversy should exist at all as to Sky's
attempted purchase of United.
While the above examples of media ownership among
football's elite clubs may imply little cause for alarm in a Skyowned United, these same examples may also serve to
demonstrate the true harm that such vertical integration may
impose on the sport in general. Paris St. Germaine, A.C. Milan,
Ajax, and United are all perennial champions of their respective
national leagues and as a result, regular competitors in intraEuropean competitions. 2 75 The underlying inference suggested
by the corporate alliances of these world football powers and
international broadcasting groups is that only teams with such
financial support and guaranteed media exposure are capable of
attaining and maintaining such a level of success and
2 76
profitability.
The risk created by the continued tolerance of, or complicity
with, such a scenario is that a football club that fails to attract a
media patron dooms itself to mediocrity. Likewise, a media
enterprise that is forced to rent the remaining sports
programming content left behind following its competitors'
acquisitions is essentially barred from entering or remaining in
the market.
These dangers are further heightened in both
industries if the controlling media groups possess substantially
all the broadcast rights to entire leagues as is now officially
277
permitted in England following the RPC decision.

273. See Came et al., supra note 4, at 58. Murdoch and Berlusconi are the
driving forces behind a yet to be realized plan to create a European superleague
featuring many of the top European clubs. See id.
274. See id.
275. Among the principle European competitions are: (1) the European
Champion's Cup, featuring the champion of each nation's league; (2) the
European Cup Winner's Cup, in which the winner of the open tournament in each
country vies for a continental title; and (3) the UEFA Cup, which counts among its
participants various powerhouse clubs who failed to top their domestic league.
276.
See infra Part VI.C. (containing additional analysis of the competitive
ramifications of media owners).
277. The European Union, however, has made evident its difficulties with
such long-term exclusive, collectively negotiated arrangements. See supra note
135.
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C. Analysis of the MMC Decision in Light
of Conflicting European Views

Although the potential for dominance and conflicts of interest
may not have fully manifested itself in the Continental sports
leagues, perhaps the distinguishing factor that prompted the
intervention of competition authorities in Great Britain was the
danger that Sky, through Murdoch, was in a position to dictate
the future of the sport of football throughout Great Britain. 2 78
Already in possession of league-wide broadcasting rights and
the technological and financial ability to maintain possession for
the foreseeable future, Sky, through its attempted takeover of
United, sounded an unmistakable warning to both the
government and the public as to the high potential for abuse
inherent in such a position.2 79 As a result of his strategic
positioning, Murdoch had acquired the capability to control the
path football broadcasting was to follow in England. Regardless
of the outcome of the OFT's challenge to the Premier League's
current pooling arrangement with Sky, Murdoch could have
either (1) possessed a seat on both sides of the bargaining table
for the next Premiership broadcasting deal or (2) gained the
United that
opportunity to initiate a pay-per-view approach 2with
80
would virtually require other clubs to follow suit.

Therefore, the factor that may distinguish the recent British
decisions from the current Continental practice is the specific risk
that the United transaction presented. Other European nations
would likely agree that no broadcasting company should be able
to purchase a dominant professional sports team when that
broadcaster already possesses the exclusive rights to the league
games in which the team plays. When such broadcasting rights
have been distributed amongst various competing media entities,
however, as they are in the United States, the same objections do
not appear as legitimate.
Even if the present practice of collectively selling exclusive,
rights were the distinguishing factor between the divergent British
and Continental viewpoints, such a conclusion did not mandate
the invalidation of the Premier League's current collective

278.
Even if Sky were forced to make concessions or accept undertakings to
be allowed to even out the imbalances created by its acquisition of United, it was

unlikely that such concessions would last very long after the current Premier
League contract runs out.
279.
While actual abuse is not inevitable, there is an overwhelming
likelihood that a business entity acquiring such great market power will take
unfair advantage of it to at least maintain its current level of control and in all

probability to continue to expand that control.
280.

See supranotes 68 and 72 and accompanying text.
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arrangement with Sky. The RPC found only that such exclusive,
collective deals were permissible; it did not require that
broadcasting rights be offered in that form. As a result, when
Sky's contract with the Premier League expires, many separate
entities will likely compete for non-exclusive rights. Under the
resulting diversified broadcasting package split among several
media entities, the dangers of collective dealing would be
substantially diminished, and Sky would likely have been much
more competitively justified in its purchase of United.
If Murdoch had allowed this scenario to play itself out, he
might have been able to essentially exchange his exclusive right
to broadcast the Premier League matches for a non-exclusive
share of the rights, plus the added acquisition of United.
However, in his eagerness to protect his own interests from an
adverse RPC decision, Murdoch may have set an unfortunate
precedent by attempting to buy United too early and under
circumstances that forced the British antitrust authorities to
block the deal. In a non-exclusive scenario, the MMC might still
have found conflict between a Sky-United merger and the public
interest, but the anti-competitive advantage Sky would have
gained would have been much less blatant, and Sky's market
power might have been sufficiently diminished to allay such
concerns and permit the takeover to occur. As a result, Murdoch
may have damaged English football and his substantial
investment in it for years to come by effectively setting the British
competition policy against the concept of media ownership of
athletic teams.
Meanwhile, the rest of Europe reaps the
(substantial, yet potentially dangerous) rewards of such
integration.
To further develop this point, it is instructive to look at
Murdoch's recent attempt to enter the football broadcasting
market in Italy.
Apparently unfazed by the government
investigation of his attempted takeover of United, Murdock
undertook a similar broadcasting strategy for top division Italian
League (Serie A) football. 2 8 ' Although Telepiu, a unit of France's
Canal Plus, had reached individual deals with a series of top
Italian clubs, including Serie A champion Juventus, Murdoch's
attempt to gain a broadcasting foothold in the Italian football

281.
See News Corp. in the Run for Italian Soccer Rights: Italy to Limit
Ownership, FIN. POST, Jan. 27, 1999, at C15. Murdoch and News Corp. are
apparently taking the stance that the MMC will be unable to stop them from
developing a worldwide monopoly on football broadcasting regardless of the
outcome in the United investigation. See id. They are essentially sending the
message to the MMC that resistance is futile.
While many predicted that the MMC will concede to Sky and that the United
deal will be allowed to go forward, few expected the takeover bid would be referred
by the OFT and Secretary in the first place. See id.
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market was met with opposition similar to that voiced in Great
2 82
Britain.
The Italian government's ruling coalition took action to
curtail Murdoch's relentless pursuit of market power by limiting
ownership of soccer pay-television rights by any one broadcaster
to sixty percent of the total league rights. 28 3 Such tactics came
under fire by News Corp., which argued that European experience
has shown that it is best to sell soccer rights exclusively to boost
the product's value and benefit the consumer and the smaller
teams. 28 4 Nevertheless, the Italian strategy might also have been
a successful alternative in Great Britain as a means of reducing
the risks of dominance of the total league market by Sky, even as
the owner of United.
Judging from the European Continental experience as a
whole, it is clear that at least some means have been discovered
to protect competition and the public interest, within the
developing context of media ownership of sports teams. However,
whether these alternative strategies would be the best approach
in England or would achieve successful results worldwide
remains open to great debate.

VI.

REACHING THE RIGHT CONCLUSION

Even if one accepts the conventional capitalist theory that an
unrestricted market can be relied upon to provide consumers
with the best possible services at the most competitive price, it is
clear that concerted anti-competitive practices can distort these
beneficial effects. When business entities possessing substantial
market power in particularized but related industries merge,
questions immediately arise concerning the potential harm
resulting from an unification to competition in those industries
and to the public interest in general.
In the market for the professional sports broadcasting,
specifically football, the British government's two recent inquiries
were both attempts to resolve the dilemma posed by the
increasing integration of the sports and broadcasting industries.
In the process of determining how much, if any, government
intervention is necessary to maintain a state of free competition,
the MMC and RPC together have established parameters for the
future integration of broadcasting and professional sports in
Great Britain and have offered reason to reconsider such

282.
283.

See id.
See id.

284.

See id.; see also infra note 295 and accompanying text.
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However, in

order to identify these parameters and estimate the worldwide

impact of the MMC's recommendation, one must first examine the
RPC's decision in
the
OFT case
brought against the

Premiership.

28 6

A. The OFT's CaseAgainst the Premiership
Both the OFT case before the RPC and the MMC's
investigation of the United takeover were means to the common
end of ensuring free competition and protecting the public
interest. Yet, the arguments advanced in favor of intervention in
each dispute appear to be countervailing.
In arguing before the RPC, the Director General of the OFT
contended that the Premier League and its broadcasters were

acting as a cartel and were responsible for inflating costs and
prices. 28 7 The OFT asserted that the resulting arrangement "put
Sky in a position of dominance in the supply of sports channels
in the United Kingdom and inhibited competition in the pay-

television market, in which premium sports programming is the
primary attraction." 28 8
As a result, the OFT argued, many
football fans find it impossible to get a ticket to a sold out
stadium and are additionally unable to follow their team regularly
28 9
on television.

285. In the European context, a paper from the EC in September of 1998 set
forth that sales of television rights and sponsorship accounted for 65-85% of the
funding of sports events and have become the primary source of financing
professional sports in Europe. See Analysis: Regulating Sport of Europe's TV
Channels, supranote 135. However, the European Union is still debating whether
the monopolistic practice of broadcasters owning the television rights and
exploiting them through their own networks is compatible with EU competition
policy. See id.
286.
See infra Part IV.C. However, as the RPC did not decide the OFT's case
until after the completion of the MMC's investigation, the MMC was forced to
evaluate all possible outcomes of the OFT case.
As a result, the MMC's
recommendation addresses various scenarios and cannot be limited merely to the
circumstances in which collective broadcasting arrangements are permissible.
See id.
287.
See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text; see also Jonathan
Miller, Media: Pay Up, Pay Up and Play the Game: The Battle for Broadcasting
Rights to Footballis in Full Pitch, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 23, 1999, at 12.
288.
Miller, supranote 287, at 12.
289.
See id.; see also Araton, supranote 4. Only 60 of the 380 Premiership
games are broadcast live on Sky, and highlights of only three are available on the
BBC's match of the day. See Miller, supra note 287, at 12. Yet, this inaccessibility
is not due to lack of coverage. See id. In fact, although cameras are recording the
action at all of the Premier League matches, viewers are not allowed to watch. See
id. Instead, while Great Britain's top grounds are 94% full on a typical Saturday
(with waiting lists for years for tickets), most fans must resort to watching Sky
Sports Centre, in which sports journalists watch games on closed circuit and
describe the action to viewers who are not allowed to see for themselves. See id.
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The Premier League countered that the current arrangement
was best for the viewers and fans, and that there was little
opportunity for variation. It was the League's claim that any
more football would destabilize the, competition of the
Premiership, virtually destroying weaker and small market clubs
and strengthening the top teams to the point where they could
2 90
not be seriously challenged.
Under the current four-year, £743 million contract, Sky pays
£670 million for the right to broadcast sixty games live with some
highlights; the BBC pays £73 million for the rights to broadcast
highlights solely. 2 9 1 The OFT's case was that more games could
be shown on more platforms by more broadcasters. 2 9 2 There
could be substantially more regional choice and in particular,
games could be made available on a pay-per-view basis to fans
who would otherwise have no opportunity to watch their favorite
team. 2 93 In effect, the OFT argued that an additional electronic,
digital TV turnstile could be created at every Premier ground,
through a pay-per-view system and that the public interest was
deprived of such a benefit by the current League-wide
2 94
agreement.
Ironically, those presenting arguments to the MMC for the
protection of football fans and competition have voiced almost
opposite arguments in protest of Sky's acquisition of United. If
Sky had taken control of United, it was argued, the broadcaster
could have essentially forced the development of televised sports
into an individualized pay-per-view format in which many small
market teams would be cut out of the market as media giants buy
out all the top clubs. Further, fans would be forced to pay an
additional premium in order to view the team of their choice, and
with no terrestrial option to choose from, fans' ultimate selection
would still be dictated by what multiple broadcasters were
inclined to offer.
B. Pay-Per-View--The Future of Sports Broadcasting?
Underlying the arguments presented to both the MMC and
the RPC in these recent proceedings was a pervasive uneasiness
surrounding
the
implementation
of pay-per-view
and
digital/satellite television in the sports broadcasting industry.

290.
See id. Thus, the League maintained that only through the collective
selling of rights and the benevolent distribution of the proceeds by the league itself
could the clubs and the sporting competition be sustained. See id.

291.
292.
293.

See supra notes 30, 33 and 41.
See Miller, supranote 287, at 12.
See id.

294.

See id.
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There was little doubt in anyone's mind that Sky's acquisition of
United would hasten the onset of some form of pay-per-view
offering. For the MMC investigation especially, the onset of payper-view implicit in Sky's purchase of United dictated the
competitive environment that would remain in the football
broadcasting industry following a successful takeover.
Not only was pay-per-view argued to clearly affect
competition in the market, it was also believed to have a
substantial impact on the public interest as well. 2 95 For many
fans who do not or cannot travel to away games or for those who
live far from the clubs they support, a pay-per-view system could
be highly attractive.
However, skeptics believe that in the
absence of exclusive coverage of live games on terrestrial
television, fans will never benefit from pay-per-view because they
are the weak comer in the club-broadcaster-supporter triangle
and have no hope of improving their bargaining position.2 9 6 Sky,
however, responds that due to its more lively and exciting
broadcasting approach, crowds at Premiership matches have
297
gone up thirty percent since Sky won the rights.
The theories as to the impact of pay-per-view presented
before the MMC and RPC are apparently divergent (the OFT
promoting the idea to the RPC as a means of benefiting
competition and the public interest and the protesters' criticizing
pay-per-view as detrimental to those interests). Yet the underlying
rationale of both arguments was essentially the same. While payper-view may or may not be the optimal broadcasting
arrangement for football in England, both sides agreed that the
choice to move towards such an arrangement must be the result
of an open market development and not merely the handiwork of
market insiders seeking to create significant barriers to entry and
control the development of the industry themselves. Regardless
of the relative merits or demerits of pay-per-view, neither Sky nor
any other broadcaster can be allowed to use market power in
sports available through vertical integration with a dominant
club, such as United, to gain and retain control over the

295.
Moreover, while Sky has been tremendously successful in its marketing
and packaging of the sport for television, the effects of a movement into pay-perview might also have a significant impact at the gate by increasing the amount of
media control over the sport in general. See Curtis, supra note 70, at 6.
"Sky packages football brilliantly and has brought a whole new dimension to
the game, but they over-hype to a shocking degree, which can be a shock to the
system when you go to a game and realise it is not as thrilling in the flesh as it
seems on TV." Id. The Sky broadcasts even add crowd noise when an insufficient
amount exists at the live matches. See id. "If the United deal goes through,
expect more media control and ownership over the game and increased use of
these tricks to bring viewers in." Id.
296.
See id.
297.
See id.
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development of the sports broadcasting market. In other words,
the problem was not with the notion of pay-per-view itself but
with the ability of Sky, had it successfully acquired United, to
dictate the terms of the development of pay-per-view broadcasting
and to dominate the market once pay-per-view is initiated.
Therefore, while the debate over the best form of football
broadcasting remains unresolved, it is clear that Sky's successful
acquisition of United would have provided an ability to force the
issue. This ability itself was cause for concern, considering the
fact that Sky both financially and technologically was uniquely
placed to benefit from an immediate move into satellite pay-perBy gaining a seat at both sides of the
view broadcasting.
negotiating table, Murdoch could have had his way with or
without the support of the nineteen other teams. Those teams
that might have declined to sign on with Sky's pay-per-view
offering would have been forced into licensing or acquisition deals
with other broadcasters in an effort to keep pace with United.
C. Impact on the Sport Itself
It should be readily apparent that an evaluation of the effects
of Sky's attempted takeover of United is incomplete when limited
to an analysis of the sports broadcasting industry. Additional
anti-competitive concerns extend directly to the competition of
Premiership clubs on the field and to the sport of football in
Since the 1995 Bosman case, 2 9 8 in which it was
general.
established that all European football players were free agents

and thus unrestricted by nationality requirements, clubs have
been forced to make massive commitments to player wages. The
resulting profit margins are so slight and the commitments so
large and long-term that finding a means of recouping such costs
299
has quickly become a primary concern for all clubs.
Submitting to media-sponsored buy-outs is an inviting solution,
in that typically a reservoir of wealth is sufficiently available to
ensure that the new owner's programming content is and will
remain of the highest quality.

298. For an extensive review of the ramifications of the Bosman decision, see
generally Rachel B. Arnedt, Comment: European Union Law in Football Nationality
Restrictions: The Economics and Politics of the Bosman Decision, 12 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 1091 (1998). Essentially, the Bosman case ended the practice of restricting
teams in a nation's top league from utilizing more than three foreigners out of
eleven players on the field at any given time. See id. at 1104. The theory was that
such a restriction would allow nation's to develop their own talented players for
use in international competition and not become dependent on a few foreigners for
success. See id. at 1010-11
299. See Miller, supranote 287, at 6.

1506

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:1445

If Sky had been allowed to gain control of United, it was
virtually certain that a chain reaction of acquisitions of other
major British clubs, such as Arsenal and Newcastle, by Sky's
British broadcasting rivals would have quickly followed.3 0 0 As a
natural consequence of such a development, the smaller market
clubs would be unable to find bidders for ownership and would be
forced either to unite with similarly situated clubs or succumb to
a less adequate offer by a major pay-per-view broadcaster. An
additional dilemma arising out of either of these arrangements
would be that the ownership rights to several clubs' matches (or
to the clubs themselves) might be held under one umbrella
entertainment group, thereby creating numerous and substantial
30
conflicts of interest. '
Furthermore, with the continuing integration of the
European Community, those smaller clubs unable to find a media
patron in their own nation might seek the support of foreign
broadcasting entities. 30 2 On the other hand, the advent of a new
European super-league, 30 3 as recently proposed, would likely
relegate all but the richest clubs to subordinate status. Such a
development would pervert the typical sports competition
framework into one where media coverage and financial
prosperity create on-the-field success rather than on-the-field
In
success creating financial prosperity and media coverage.
such a scenario, even major domestic clubs could be left out

without

media

dollars

or

other

currency

backing

their

performance on the field and over the airwaves.

It is not at all
300.
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
surprising that of the six submissions received by the MMC in favor of the bid
(versus thousands which objected to it, including the British Football Association
itself), all six were from very strong Premier League clubs (Arsenal, Aston Villa,
Leeds, Newcastle, Tottenham, and Southhampton). See Mihir Bose, Media Groups
Continue Will to Woo Clubs, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 10, 1999, at 8.
301.
The Premier League has attempted to address some of these potential
conflicts by mandating that no business entity (broadcasting or otherwise) may
own a 10% stake in more than one Premier League club. See John Cassy & Julia
Finch, BSkyB Linked to Premiership Buying Spree, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 11,
1999, at 12; see also Mihir Bose, Murdoch Sets His Sights on Leeds, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Aug. 11, 1999, at 38. Interestingly, this rule has spawned another
strategy by Murdoch to protect and augment Sky's ability to acquire future
Premier League rights. See Bose, supra. Sky has undertaken to purchase less
than 10% interests in several Premier League clubs, such as Leeds United. See id.
While Sky would then be forced to sell off the excess of its current 14% stake in
United, Murdoch apparently feels this approach will benefit Sky in the securing of
Unfortunately, the ultimate
See id.
future football broadcasting rights.
ramifications of this strategy will only be discernable at some point following the
publication of this Note.
See supra notes 155-56 (discussing legal ramifications of such a
302.
foreign purchase of a British football club).
303.
See supra note 67.
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D. The American Approach
Perhaps the future of European sports broadcasting may be
found in the American system that "in spite of its entrepreneurial
nature has followed an egalitarian line."3 0 4 All American NFL
football games, except one Sunday night game, are shown free on
terrestrial television and are funded by exorbitant advertising
slots.3 0 5 Television rights and merchandizing income account for
about $2-2.5 billion a year, which is shared equally among the
NFL's thirty-one teams, allowing such small market franchises as
Green Bay and Pittsburgh to thrive.3 0 6 The objective of such a
system is to make any team capable of winning on any given
Sunday, which preserves American football's position as the
country's leading fan sport and simultaneously creates a
disincentive for any one broadcaster to try to dominate the
market.
This system seems to offer the best of both worlds-it
protects smaller market clubs from having to compete with more
popular and better financed rivals for individual broadcasting
arrangements while at the same time dividing the rights among
various media groups and preventing the accumulation of market
power in any one broadcaster. While the current British approach
could not be easily adapted to the U.S. system that also includes
a yearly draft of college players to encourage greater parity of
talent, a more protected free competition arrangement might
eventually be viewed as feasible. This is especially true if English
clubs begin to suffer on and off the field defeat at the hands of
However, even under the U.S. system,
Continental rivals.
permitting the most powerful sports broadcaster in the country to
gain control of the most powerful team in the country's top league
would likely give that combined entity extraordinary control over
the state of competition in both the sports and broadcasting
industries.
E. Ultimate Effects of the MMC's Recommendation
In conclusion, the narrowest interpretation of the British
government's decision to prohibit British Sky Broadcasting from
purchasing Manchester United is that Sky cannot buy United.
Under the specific factual circumstances, this was clearly the
right decision. The fact that the subsequently proposed NTL-

304.
305.
306.
Cleveland

Curtis, supranote 70, at 6.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See Curtis, supra note 70, at 6 (now 31 teams with the addition of the
Browns).
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Newcastle merger was referred to the newly created Competition
Commission and the fact that the Department of Trade and
Industry has recommended keeping a watchful eye on the
broadcasting industry's interrelations with the sport of football
further suggest that the MMC's Sky-United determination may be
extended to prevent any British media entity from purchasing a
British football team. In light of the more permissive Continental
approach, however, it is much less clear that such a conclusion is
the only right approach.
Additionally, as the MMC's recommendation to prohibit the
United takeover cuts against this recent European acquiescence
to such vertical integration of media and sports entities (of
carriage and content), it remains unclear what the best approach
is to resolve this dilemma on a European and global scale. Some

would argue that the convergence of sports and media is
inevitable and should be controlled but cautiously encouraged, if
for no other reason than to keep pace with those who have
already accepted it. Others contend that the inherent necessity of
an even playing field as a prerequisite to the continued vitality
and success of professional sports mandates that mega-media
conglomerates stay on the sidelines and out of the owner's boxes.
Still others suggest that these same media companies, the
supposed enemies of sport, have been the reason for the
phenomenal success of professional athletics-such proponents
of integration espouse curtailing government intervention and
allowing the market (based on this initial success) to ultimately
decide who should own what.3 0 7 One thing is certain, howeverthere are many more professional sports teams than there are
broadcasters willing to purchase them. It is thus extremely
difficult to imagine a situation in which those teams owned by
broadcasters would not have a substantial advantage over all
others, and a situation in which those broadcaster/owners would
not dominate the market for sports broadcasting.
Finally, even if the alleged anti-competitive implications of
media ownership of professional sports teams are unfounded (or,
if legitimate, can be mitigated), there still remains the issue of
whether such vertical integration is detrimental to the public
Throughout this analysis of the recent trend of
interest.
integration of the media and sports industries, the underlying

307. A writer for the Murdoch-owned The Times of London claimed that the
government's decision to block the United deal "leaves English football
dangerously isolated in Europe." Hughes, supra note 272. "What now has to be
decided is where government intervention, leading to government control, takes
British sport. The monopoly situation that many feared is still a threat, no matter
A monopoly by government, itself a transient thing
who is the paymaster.
dependent on votes through popularity, cannot be the future." Id.
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issue and ultimate legalism has been this concept of the public
interest. While (1) price and accessibility to consumers, (2) effect
on the sport as a whole, (3) impact on the negotiations and
agreements between teams, leagues, and broadcasters, and (4)
popular opinion have all been cited both in favor of and against
the public interest, the notion remains vague and perpetually
malleable by political opportunism.
F. United Considerationas a Solution
Regardless of whether the public outcry over the merger of
sports and media is found to be an irrational and untenable
reaction to the inevitable commercialization of sport or a
legitimate concern for the abuse of market power destroying
competition, the ultimate objective is to guide the development of

the sports and media industries towards a prosperous and
beneficial future for all involved-the
owners, players,
broadcasters, and fans. Although many European countries have
implicitly acquiesced to this potentially anti-competitive
integration and the U.S. market may possess inherent restraints
sufficient to prevent the full manifestation of its accompanying
anti-competitive effects, the issue had never received formal
consideration until the MMC's investigation.
The decision of the British antitrust authorities to halt a $1
billion takeover bid provided enough publicity and created
enough intelligent debate to ensure that a carefully thought out
resolution was reached.
Although the method of analysis
required is necessarily case-specific, and as the adage goes, "bad
facts often make bad law," the OFT's suggestion and the
Secretary's agreement to refer the matter to the MMC appears to
have been a prudent choice. As discussed in this Note, the anticompetitive implications of the merger had the clear potential to
cause irreparable damage to both industries if left unchecked. A
proper investigation was necessary to determine the likelihood of
such adverse consequences occurring and to explore the actual
effect on the public interest, however that concept is
interpreted.3 0 8
All in all, the diverse array of domestic, international,
political, and economic issues and implications inherent in the
merger of media and sports were clearly recognized and evaluated
in the MMC's investigation. Both the formal mechanisms and
informal solicitation of opinion established by the MMC

308.
For discussion of the varying interpretations of the public interest, see
supra note 111. For description of the difficulties establishing the scope of the
market under consideration, see supra notes 242 and 244.
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throughout the course of its investigation went a long way
towards easing public concern and developing intelligent debate.
Although the MMC recommended that the British Sky
Broadcasting-Manchester United merger be prohibited, it will only
be through the united consideration of the diverse array of issues
presented by any future transaction involving sports and media
that the true competition in sports will continue to be determined
30 9
by "the round ball" and not "the square box."
JonathanE. Bush*

309, Curtis, supranote 70, at 6.
* J.D. Candidate, 2000, Vanderbilt Law School; B.A., Vanderbilt University.

